Moscow: IBA Publishing House, 2013, 496 p.

In the history of any country, you can count many victories and defeats. Victories quickly become a matter of national pride, and eventually a part of the national mythology. Defeats, on the contrary, tend to make you think and take a more sober look at yourself and your place in the world. This is exactly the role that the Crimean War played in Russia's history, which gave rise not only to great reforms, but also to a powerful intellectual movement that transformed the entire ideological landscape of the country in a short time. And although the eyes of thinking people were primarily focused on the internal life of the empire, the relationship with the victors and the future of the "Crimean System" could not but occupy a prominent place in the public discussions of that time. It is this aspect of Russian social thought that is the focus of the author's peer-reviewed work.

From the whole complex of international problems and contradictions generated by the "Crimean System", A. A. Boldyrev tries to isolate those that are related to Russia's relations with the traditional weak opponent of Russia - the Ottoman Empire. There is no doubt about the relevance of this topic. Although international relations have been primarily the relations of a few great powers for centuries, the object of their disputes has often been medium and small countries, which have thus been drawn into the orbit of "high politics" and have not missed the opportunity to make the most of this situation. This was the situation of the Ottoman Empire, whose foreign policy in the last century of its existence was reduced, in fact, to maneuvering between the great powers for the purpose of elementary self-preservation. Therefore, although the title of the reviewed work is "Russian-Turkish relations", in fact it is often about the Eastern question in all its complexity.

The object of study in A.V. Boldyrev's book is Russian public opinion, which actually means all printed and public speeches of various people (from court ladies to staff generals and magazine publishers), at least in some way affecting the Turkish theme. It should be noted that it was during the reign of Alexander II that the term "public opinion "in Russia for the first time began to approach the modern in its content and was transferred from aristocratic salons (Pushkin's" whisper, laughter of fools...") to the field of press and journalism. Accordingly, numerous sources for its study appear, which are fully used in this work. Unfortunately, the author did not consider it necessary to include in his work at least a brief source review, which would greatly facilitate the reader's acquaintance with the main content of the book.

The extensive material collected by A.V. Boldyrev clearly demonstrates the main dilemma faced by Russian foreign policy, and after it, public opinion at the final stage of the Crimean War, during the preparation of the Paris Treaty, and during the entire period of its operation. The terms of peace imposed by the victors (especially the neutralization of the Black Sea) were incompatible with Russia's fundamental interests. At the same time, an immediate rematch was unthinkable. Consequently, it was necessary to accept the inevitability and think about the likely appearance of an opportunity for revising such an intolerable regime, while at the same time implementing the necessary internal reforms. This idea is a refrain in numerous quotes from various people, quoted by A.V. Boldyrev in the book. As for the Ottoman Empire itself, it was obvious to Russian observers that it was defeated among the victors, and the Crimean War finally pushed it onto the path of economic and financial subordination to the West, from which it was never destined to leave. Its existence was supported solely by the mutual distrust of the Western powers, as well as their common desire to preserve this decrepit state as a barrier against Russia. Nevertheless, sooner or later the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was inevitable, and Russia had to be prepared to protect its interests in the process.

Accordingly, there were no prospects for any effective Russian-Turkish cooperation, although it would seem that there was a common interest in revising a number of articles of the Paris Treaty. As can be seen from the work of A.V. Boldyrev, this point of view is supported by-

It was widely used in Russian public opinion in the mid-19th century. With minor nuances, it was shared by M. P. Pogodin, V. A. Cherkassky, P. A. Chikhachev, B. N. Chicherin and many others. The only dissonance in this harmonious chorus was an article by V. Neklyudov (about whom, unfortunately, there is no biographical data in A.V. Boldyrev's book1), published in Russkiy Vestnik No. 9-10 (September-October), 1864 (in A.V. Boldyrev's book Russkaya Mysl, pp. 214-225). This author was convinced that Russia and Turkey had no more irreconcilable contradictions and, therefore, their interests would be best served by fruitful cooperation in the spirit of Unkyar-Iskelesi.

Of great interest in A. V. Boldyrev's book is the section devoted to the" Black Sea problem " in Russian-Turkish relations, primarily the problem of the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus (pp. 227-330). The demilitarization of the Black Sea posed a threat to Russia's security. The slave trade and arms smuggling flourished due to Russia's lack of a strong Black Sea fleet and fortified outposts on the coast. Comments on this topic were usually made by people who were personally familiar with the situation (M. A. Baryatinsky, D. A. Milyutin, P. A. Chikhachev, R. A. Fadeev, etc.). However, for censorship reasons, these comments, in addition to the book by R. A. Fadeev, published in 1860 (see p. 296), became available to the general public. available only many years later. The desire of the Ottoman Empire and the Western powers behind it to destabilize the situation in the southern regions of Russia by any means led to the tragic outcome of most of the Circassian (Adyghe) population, since for foreign "patrons" the peoples of the Caucasus were nothing more than a bargaining chip in a big geopolitical game.

The section devoted to the economic relations between Russia and the Ottoman Empire (pp. 331-389) provides good material for deeper generalizations related to the peculiarities of Russia's foreign policy not only in the middle of the XIX century, but also in a broader historical perspective. Our country was actively involved in the struggle for influence in the Ottoman Empire. However, the ideas about the essence of this "influence" were, to put it mildly, archaic in Russia at that time. The Crimean War had shaken Russia's military and naval power, but it was only a matter of time before they were restored. The situation was much worse with other elements of foreign policy influence, which in modern political science is usually called "soft power". Russia had virtually no economic leverage in the Ottoman Empire. The volume of mutual trade was negligible, and there was no direct investment at all. Turkey was nothing more than a transit route for our goods (especially bread) to Western Europe. The only commercially successful project was the "Russian Society of Shipping and Trade", which existed under the greenhouse conditions of an artificial monopoly and direct patronage from the Russian government. 351-368). It is noteworthy that the journalists and publicists who covered its activities almost did not touch on the commercial prospects of trade with Turkey, probably due to their insignificance (pp. 371-372). This was in sharp contrast to the increasing penetration of Western powers into the High-tech economy, which was mainly a matter of private business. The economic ties of the Ottoman Empire, in turn, could not but influence its foreign policy orientation.

The last section of A.V. Boldyrev's book is devoted to the preparation and implementation of the Black Sea neutralization program in 1871, as well as the reaction of Russian society to these events (pp. 435-475). The author reveals the complex relationship between two key figures of Russian foreign policy during this period-Foreign Minister A.M. Gorchakov and Ambassador to Constantinople N. P. Ignatiev. The former was known for his caution and consistency in political matters, the latter was inclined to make far-reaching plans for the future and did not give up on risks. While advocating for an active Russian policy in the Balkans and even for the elimination of Turkish domination in this region, he was nevertheless able to gain exceptional influence in the Turkish capital. But paradoxically, the action that radically changed Russia's foreign policy situation and actually restored its great-power status, lost in 1856, was carried out by Gorchakov not only "behind Ignatiev's back", but also in spite of his protests. As for the reaction of Russian society, it is quite predictable

¹ Vasily Sergeevich Neklyudov (1818-1880) - full state Councilor, graduate of the Tsarskoye Selo Lyceum in 1838, author of the book "The Slavic Question" (Moscow: Printing House of A. I. Mamontov and ^Co., 1876, 61 p).

It was extremely positive, which was greatly facilitated by Gorchakov's constant contact with the press.

In general, A.V. Boldyrev's book provides a fairly complete cross-section of the ideas and opinions that were expressed in the Russian press and journalism in relation to Turkey and the Eastern question at a time when Russia's ability to somehow influence its development was perhaps the smallest in the entire history of the two empires. It provides a holistic picture of the perception of the Eastern Question by Russian society over a rather long and important period of time, thereby filling in a certain gap in the existing historiography, which so far has covered only certain aspects and plots of this problem. The author's style is distinguished by thoroughness and great attention to detail. Almost every event mentioned and almost every last name is given extensive commentary in footnotes. Sometimes the author's diligence in this sense seems somewhat superfluous, since the volume of footnotes in some places significantly exceeds the volume of the corresponding text. This, however, only proves once again that the work of L. V. Boldyrev will be extremely useful to anyone who wants to understand the intricacies of the Eastern question in all its various details.

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