Until 1914, there was a brisk trade between Russia and Palestine. In 1913, Russian imports to Palestine amounted to 1,380,000 francs, while Palestinian exports to Russia amounted to 220,000 francs. In the early 1920s, the presence of Soviet goods on the Palestinian market was barely noticeable. "Russia's participation in the import trade of Palestine is still very weak, "the Jewish-Palestinian magazine Trade and Industry wrote in the summer of 1924 in an issue specifically devoted to "questions of Russian trade with the Middle East." By the spring of 1924, the U.S.S.R. had imported goods worth " a little more than 250,000 fun. ". In the case of Palestinian imports, this was "a very small amount". At the same time, the import of goods to the USSR from Palestine amounted to "only 247 pounds." "Obviously," the Palestinian observer stated, " we are not talking about proper trade turnover, but about sending gifts to private individuals "[Trade..., 1924, p. 284].

Keywords: Middle East, Palestine, "Jewish national home", Soviet-Palestinian trade relations, Palestinian Agency ARCOS.

The return of Russian goods to the Palestinian market became possible after the transition to a New Economic Policy and the normalization of Soviet-British relations. On June 11, 1920, the All - Russian Cooperative Society was established in London, better known by the abbreviation of its English - language name-All Russian Cooperative Society Limited-as Arcos Ltd, or ARKOS. On March 16, 1921, Moscow and London concluded a trade agreement, on the basis of which ARKOS received the status of "the trade apparatus of the Soviet trade mission [in Great Britain]" [RGAE, f. 3270, op. 1, d.80, l. 135]. In December 1922, the Russian Eastern Chamber of Commerce (RVTP) was established in Moscow. In its structure, the Middle Eastern, Middle Eastern and Far Eastern sections were distinguished [Palestine, 1929, p. 945]. "In the beginning, our friendly relations with the countries of the East had an exclusively political content, when both the Soviet Republic and the Eastern states were fighting for political independence against the common enemy - world imperialism," G. V. Chicherin said at the general meeting of members of the RVTP on February 15, 1924. productive forces and the reconquest or defense of their economic independence." In solving this strategic task, a key role was assigned to the RVTP, which, according to Chicherin, "became a joint that unites representatives of the economic policy of the USSR and the countries of the East" [DVP USSR, 1963, p. 945].

The establishment and development of trade relations between the USSR and Palestine took place in the context of the rapid growth of the latter's economy, which was the result of Zionist economic colonization [Shapovalov, 2010, pp. 44-54]. Although in tse-

In the Soviet propaganda of that time, Zionism was harshly criticized as a tool in the hands of "British imperialism" ¹. Such founders of Soviet Oriental studies as V. A. Gurko-Kryazhin noted in their works "the progressive role of Jewish colonists-adherents of Zionism" in the development of Palestine: "For the agricultural development of the country, mainly in the field of winemaking and the tree cultures and Jewish colonies have done a lot." Gurko-Kryazhin pointed out the" enormous importance "of Zionist colonization for the capitalization of Palestine:" Jewish emigration brought many merchants and bankers to Palestine, who immediately began to realize their capital here: the annual influx of money to Jews from abroad alone reaches 10 million francs " (Gurko-Kryazhin, 1923, pp. 12-13).]. In the 1920s, Soviet researchers repeatedly noted that without the influx of foreign capital, "in particular, to Zionist organizations," Palestine "would undoubtedly face complete impoverishment" [Palestine, 1927, p. 209]. Thus, the Zionist colonization of Palestine was recognized by Soviet Orientalists as the most important factor in the development of the economy of the "promised land" and the country's inclusion in the world economic system.

The leading export products of the "Jewish national hearth" created under the auspices of Great Britain were oranges, grapes and olives [RGAE, f. 4004, op. 1, d. 206, l. 11]. The main consumer of agricultural products of the new Jewish-Palestinian community was Great Britain. It was also the largest supplier of food, textiles, construction materials and machinery to Palestine. The negative trade balance of the Palestinian economy during the entire interwar period testified to its dependence on the mandate State [Shchevelev, 1999, p.149].

The growth of agricultural exports of Jewish collective and cooperative farms largely depended on external supplies of packaging materials-box sets-a scarce commodity in Palestine, which was practically devoid of forest vegetation in the 1920s." Palestine spends 60,000 - 70,000 eg. pounds annually on box wood and other materials, " the Information and Economic Bulletin of the Supreme Economic Council of the RSFSR reported [RGAE, f. 4004, op. 1, d. 206, l. 11]. When, on the one hand, thanks to the success of the Zionist colonization of Palestine, the demand for these materials exceeded the supply of British, French and Italian companies operating there, and competition between Jewish enterprises, on the other, forced the latter to look for new suppliers and consumers, Soviet foreign trade organizations and all-Union associations had a chance to make themselves known in the Palestinian market.

On December 1, 1923, under the auspices of the ARKOS Constantinople office in Jaffa, the Palestinian Arkos Agency (PAA) began to operate. Throughout the entire existence of the PAA, the position of its manager was held by Eduard Solomonovich Goltsman, his assistant was Lazar Aronovich Glazer. To what extent did being Jewish help and to what extent did it prevent Goltzman and Glaser from fulfilling their official duties in Palestine? The sources at our disposal do not provide an opportunity to answer this question. It can be assumed that Goltzman and Glazer may have repeatedly felt themselves in the position of "friends among strangers" (representatives of the USSR in the "Anglo-Zionist colony") and "strangers among their own" (internationalist Jews in the "Jewish national hearth"). In any case, the general national-

¹ Here is just one example of criticism of this kind: "English imperialism has long since forgotten the Balfour Declaration ...It is not in [his] interest to antagonize the growing Arab revolutionary movement for the sake of the Jews... They [the British imperialists] know that no matter how much they spit in the face of the Zionist lackeys, the TS will serve them like dogs loyally, [because] they are not able to give up the English illusion... with the disappearance [of which] all Zionism dies out simultaneously as an idea and a movement" [Bogen, 1926, p. 9].

The ownership of employees of the PAA and its counterparties was not a basis for resolving various trade conflicts. The PAA documents show that Goltzman and Glazer took an exceptionally businesslike approach to their work.

It should be noted that Palestine was considered by ARKOS only as a springboard for the penetration of Soviet economic organizations and state trade unions into the Middle East. The Egyptian market was considered a priority. In April 1924, the PAA registered its representative office in Egypt "as a result of long troubles". However, it was never " opened due to the failure to obtain a permanent visa for the [PAA] representative, and some operations were carried out there through trips of the [PAA] representative." In July 1925, the PAA opened its representative office in Syria, but "after existing for only two months, i.e. without leaving the stage of organization, it was closed [by the French authorities] in August 1925." The failure of the PAA in Egypt and Syria was explained by Goltzman by the machinations of the British and French mandate administrations: "Having formally allowed the appearance on their territory From the very beginning, the British and French authorities in Palestine and Egypt and in Syria showed a pronounced unfriendly attitude towards them" [RGAE, f. 3270, op. 1, d. 695, l. 1].

In order to ensure "all operations for the export of timber products to the countries of the Middle East", a Special Board was established in 1924 as part of the Central Department of the Forest and Woodworking Industry of the Supreme Economic Council of the RSFSR - the State Volga-Caspian Timber Industry Trust (VKL). All timber export activities were to be carried out "under the control and guidance of the NCVT" [RGAE, f. 4004, op. 1, d. 30, l. 12, 18]. In February 1924, a special representative office of the VKL was opened at the trade mission of the USSR in Turkey "to serve the entire Middle East and the Mediterranean countries" [RGAE, f. 4004, op. 1, d. 635, l. 4]. Finally, in May 1924, with the aim of "studying the Palestinian and Egyptian forest markets", the chairman of the VKL, I. S. Lavrov, arrived in Palestine. During his just over two-week visit, the Chairman of the VKL visited the country's largest cities-Jaffa, Tel Aviv and Haifa [WGAE, f. 4004, op. 1, d. 635, l. 61].

The success of Lavrov's mission was largely due to the support of the PAA, whose staff held preparatory talks with the British authorities and business circles in Palestine, Syria, Egypt and Lebanon. On May 27, Lavrov was received by the" city head " of Tel Aviv, Meir Dizengof. During the conversation with Lavrov, the founding father of Tel Aviv and a well-known Zionist figure "was very sympathetic to the trade initiatives of Co-Russia with Palestine." In his report, Lavrov emphasized Dizengoff's point "that it would be very interesting and desirable if Russia not only imported its goods to Palestine, but also exported oranges and lemons to Russia" [RGAE, f. 4004, op. 1, d.635, l. 79]. On May 30, Lavrov and Glazer participated in a meeting of the Jaffa Chamber of Commerce.² After informing the members of the chamber about the goals of his visit, Lavrov asked them to " assist him in obtaining the necessary information about the state of the Palestinian market, its needs for each product separately, on the terms of trade, etc., and most importantly-in identifying goods that Russia could buy on the local market, and in clarifying the conditions." sales" [Trade..., 1924, p. 274].

During Lavrov's stay in Palestine, Jewish entrepreneurs approached him with a number of commercial proposals. "We are interested in large quantities of Russian spruce and pine," Samuel Gerhman, president of the crate factory, wrote to the chairman of the VKL [RGAE, f. 4004, op. 1, d. 635, l. 20]. Correspondence with the Association of Construction and Missile Defense related to the time of Lavrov's stay in Palestine has been preserved-

² Of the five Chambers of commerce that existed in Palestine during the period under review, two were Jewish (Chamber of Commerce, Jaffa and District and Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Haifa), two were Arab (National Chamber of Commerce, Jaffa and National Chamber of Commerce, Jaffa), and only one was united (United Chamber of Commerce) [Axlrod, 1931, p. 306].

Haschahar Industries (Jaffa) [RGAE, f. 4004, op. 1, d. 635, l. 31]. Thus, the chairman of the VKL rightly wrote in the report:" We personally got acquainted with a number of firms and know which ones are creditworthy and are of interest to us, and vice versa " [RGAE, f. 4004, op. 1, d.635, l. 41]. Business circles of the new Jewish-Palestinian community, interested in establishing "normal trade relations with Russia," recommended that the Soviet economic agencies "hurry up with taking a certain place in the Palestinian consumer market; otherwise, due to a number of conditions (rapid development of the country, competition with almost all countries of the world, etc.), it [Russia] risks losing forever local market" [Trade..., 1924, p. 284].

According to Lavrov's estimates, the needs of the Palestinian market for timber ranged from 30 thousand to 32 thousand cubic meters of wood. The sale of spruce species to Palestine, although it was most in demand on the Palestinian market, Lavrov considered unprofitable, since it "is considered much cheaper against pine." During his tour of the "promised land", Lavrov was primarily looking for buyers of expensive pine wood and box sets. Lavrov considered Romania (spruce supplies) and Sweden (pine supplies) to be the main competitors of VKL in the Palestinian market. "The main consumer of forest materials in Palestine is the Solel-Boneh construction workers' organization, a cooperative association of construction workers," Lavrov told the Soviet envoy to Turkey, Ya.Z. Suritz. However, it was not possible to conclude a contract with the "working" Solel-Bone. Business relations were established with "solid forestry firms: Orient, Izmozhek-Tsyrlin, Landau, Gashakhar, Kudryatsky, Ginzburg" [RGAE, f. 4004, op. 1, d. 635, l. 32-33, 35].

The report of Lavrov reveals the tactics of his communication with Jewish entrepreneurs: "The negotiations were mainly conducted by me with Orient. The rest of the firms served me as a material that made Orient be more accommodating." The VK Chairman's negotiating position was strengthened by the arrival in Jaffa on June 10 of wood from the VK, which, as Lavrov notes, turned out to be "beyond my expectations" and of high quality. Having obtained such a trump card, the chairman of the VKL went on the offensive against Orient: "I demanded to give a final answer on the conclusion of the deal in 24 hours, otherwise we will open our warehouse in Jaffa, from which we will trade at the prices stated by me." Only on June 12, as Lavrov emphasizes, "an hour before the departure of the steamer", on which the chairman of the VKL was returning to the USSR, "an agreement was signed with Orient for 3,000 cubic meters of pine and 5,000 cubic meters of box sets totaling 32,000 pounds sterling" [RGAE, f. 4004, op. 1, D. 635, L. 40]. Later, as follows from the PAA reports, it was the Orient company that became the main consumer of Soviet forest products [RGAE, f. 3270, op. 1, d. 695, l. 20-22].

At the beginning of 1925, the PAA was reorganized "on the basis of direct subordination to the Board of ARCOS with the right to conclude direct transactions with [Soviet] state bodies" [RGAE, f. 3270, op. 1, d. 274, l. 1]. Thus, the PAA was granted autonomy from the USSR's Foreign Trade Department, which freed ARKOS ' agents in Palestine from a whole series of bureaucratic procedures. The status of the PAA was also enhanced by the fact that ARKOS received membership in the RVTP in August 1925 [RGAE, f. 3270, op. 1, d. 552, l. 220]. Finally, the opening of the ARKOS office in Odessa in June 1924 [RGAE, f. 4004, op. 1, d. 206, l. 14] brought PAA closer to its suppliers, and the restoration from October 1924 of the regular freight and passenger line of the Main Agency of the USSR State Merchant Fleet in the Middle East "Odessa-Constantinople-Jaffa"[RGAE, f. 7795, op. 1, d. 10, l. 1] made it possible to establish a channel for the systematic supply of Soviet goods to Palestine [RGAE, f. 4004, op. 1, d. 206, l. 14].

In the early 1920s, banking ties were also established between the USSR and the Jewish-Palestinian community. In 1921, in order to promote the "revival of the country"

General Federation of Jewish Workers of Eretz Israel (Histadrut) founded Rabochy Bank, which received the status of correspondent of the State Bank of the RSFSR and the All-Russian Cooperative Bank, through which Rabochy Bank transferred money from Palestine to Russia and from Russia to Palestine. In 1926, a representative office of the Commercial and Industrial Bank of the USSR was opened in Jaffa [RGASPI, f. 272, op. 1, d. 467, l. 176]. The enterprises of Jewish Palestine became the main partners of the Soviet state trade unions in the "promised land". The statement of personal accounts for the account of PAA buyers for December 1923-September 1925 lists 34 counterparties-exclusively Jewish firms and "merchants". There are already 81 counterparties in the turnover statement on the buyers ' account for 1925-1926 - new ones are added to the previous buyers, representing also (with the exception of three merchants - Yusuf Jaffa el Jani, Said Beshar and Ala Beil) the Jewish sector of the Palestinian economy [RGAE, f. 3270, op. 1, d. 695, l. 12 - 13,20 - 22].

The promotion of Soviet construction goods was also facilitated by the British administration's measures aimed at developing the Palestinian economy. "One of the most important import industries [in Palestine] is construction," the OGPU INO reported to the NKID of the USSR. - Government of [Palestine] seeks to improve existing conditions. The revision of duties and excise taxes has been started, so that clearing of duties can now be done faster... A new customs tariff was issued, which came into force on August 15, 1924.According to the latter, many estimated rates were replaced by specific rates" [WUA RF, l. 23-24].

All export goods of Soviet agricultural organizations and state trade unions were divided into four groups: I-life supplies (potatoes, wheat, barley, snuff, herring and roach); II-raw materials and semi-processed materials (aspen decks, pine and cedar boards, plywood, match straws); III-animals (sheep); IV - products (matches, cement, soda) [RGAE, f. 3270, op. 1, d. 695, l. 32]. The basis of Soviet exports to Palestine in the 1920s. goods of Group 1 and II were accounted for, and their gross revenue for the reporting period of 1925/1926, when, according to Goltzman, "trade operations (conducted by PAA. - M. A.) began to increase" [RGAE, f. 3270, op. 1, d. 274, l. 1], was 29,581,272 and And 454.151 f. st. [RGAE, f. 3270, op. 1, d. 695, l. 32]. The total gross revenue was 41,360,108 f. st. [RGAE, f. 3270, op. 1, d. 695, l. 32]. The largest suppliers of "vital supplies" were Exportkhleb (738.5 tons of barley, 439.5 tons of wheat) and Ukrgostorg (379 tons of potatoes), timber-INCL (2135.8 cubic meters), Lesbel (93.486 cubic meters) and Russotürk (1.67 cubic meters). At the Odessa branch of the Ukrainian-Eastern Chamber of Commerce, a special forestry section was created that directly organized the export of timber products to Palestine. In 1925, therefore, 10,000 cubic meters of forest materials (mainly box sets and plywood) were delivered there. Since 1927, timber products have occupied the main place in Soviet exports to Palestine. Sevkavgostorg has put 10 tons of a test batch of cement on the Palestinian market. Already in 1922-1923, 459 tons of cement were exported to the Palestinian market, and in 1924 - 990 tons (about 12% of all Soviet exports to Palestine) [Makeev, 1984, p. 21]. Soviet goods of other groups entered the Palestinian market in scanty quantities: seven sheep from Ukrgostorg, two barrels of honey, 10 kg of sponge cake from Pishchetrest, etc. [RGAE, f. 3270, op. 1, d. 695, l. 33].

In the 1920s, Palestinian consumers began to buy Soviet oil products. By 1924, 230,000 kg of fuel oil, 10,000 "cans of gasoline", and 50,000 "cans of kerosene and other lighting products" were imported from the USSR to Palestine. The main importers of petroleum products to Palestine at that time were the United States (about 85%) and Romania (about 7%). "If we consider in total that Palestine purchased 150,000 pounds' worth of various petroleum products during this period [August 1922 - June 1924], then Russia, which imported 13,000 pounds ' worth of these products, ranks next to Soed. States

second place and successfully competes with Romania", - summed up the Palestinian magazine " Trade and Industry "[Trade..., 1924, p. 286]. It should be noted that due to the lack of oil storage facilities in Palestine during the period under review, Soviet oil products were delivered first to Syria and Egypt, where ARKOS had such facilities, and only then to Palestine. However, in the Palestinian customs records, all goods imported were registered by their country of last location, and most goods transiting through Egypt and Syria were registered as goods of Egyptian and Syrian origin. The import of Soviet oil products from Egypt in 1926 amounted to 6,046. 1 tons for the amount of 202,237 Egyptian francs (Palestina, 1929, p. 539).

Trade, industrial and agricultural fairs and exhibitions played an important role in the development of trade relations between the USSR and the new Jewish-Palestinian community. In the summer of 1923, the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee invited "Palestinian workers" to take part in the Moscow International Agricultural Exhibition. The "Palestinian pavilion" was decorated with two flags - red and blue and white (since 1948-the official flag of the State of Israel). The " Palestinian delegation "was headed by the General Secretary of Histadrut, the leader of" proletarian Zionism", the future first Prime Minister of Israel D. Ben-Gurion. His " Index to the Palestine Department (N. - M. A.)" emphasized the modernizing role of Jewish colonization in the development of Palestine and the advantages of Jewish enterprises and their products over Arab ones. "The extensive construction activity of Palestine is of particular importance for the foreign trade of the U.S.S.R., "the Index noted." At present, Palestine imports large quantities of cement, timber, iron, oil, gasoline, etc. construction and fuel materials that Russian foreign trade needs to sell" [RGASPI, l. 7-9].

In turn, Soviet economic institutions and foreign trade organizations successfully announced themselves in October 1925 at the" Commercial and Industrial Exhibition of the Middle East " (Levant Fair) in Tel Aviv. The initiative to organize the exhibition, Glaser reported to Moscow, belonged to "a group of European and American emigrants who have come to Palestine in recent years" [RGAE. f. 3270, op. 1, d. 641, l. 14]. Even on the eve of the opening of the exhibition, the local press ,according to PAA, " indicated the interest shown by the USSR in the Palestinian exhibition." The Trade Mission of the USSR in Turkey and the PAA tried to use all the opportunities of the exhibition to increase Soviet exports to Palestine. "We note that Palestine is a country of import," Glaser wrote in this connection in Batum , "and therefore the local population is interested not only in what the USSR can export, but also in everything that the USSR produces" [RGAE, f. 3270, op. 1, d. 552, l. 413].

The Soviet exposition at the Tel Aviv exhibition was organized and presented by PAA with the support of RVTP [RGAE, f. 3270, op. 1, d. 552, l. 405]. PAA was instructed to organize such an exhibition pavilion, which after the closing of the exhibition could become a permanent exhibition of goods of Soviet industry and agriculture at the PAA. The Soviet pavilion was assigned the task of promoting Soviet export products among Middle Eastern firms and "merchants" and collecting samples of local products for acquaintance with them by Soviet manufacturers [RGAE, f. 3270, op. 1, d.618, l. 1-7].

PAA has done a lot of preparatory work. In particular, its employees developed a questionnaire designed for visitors to the Soviet pavilion. PAA was interested in the extent to which the products of Soviet industry and agriculture meet the needs and tastes of visitors; what products are sold in local markets; what difficulties are encountered in the sale of Soviet goods and what needs to be done to eliminate them; what can local firms export to the USSR and what are their export resources? [Makeev, 1984, p. 23-24].

According to PAA's own estimates, he managed to achieve " exceptional success at the Exhibition, recognized by the press, numerous visitors and even representatives of the government." Having presented the products and raw materials of about 30 Soviet economic organizations in its pavilion, PAA proved to be "the monopolist of the greatest opportunities to meet local demand." The most favorable impression on the participants and guests of the exhibition was made by Soviet timber products (VKL), potatoes (Soyuzkartofel), sugar and cattle (Ukrgostorg) [RGAE, f. 3270, op. 1, d. 641, l. 16]. Chemtrest and Metallotrest also participated in the Exhibition [DVP SSSR, 1965, p. 637].

PAA strongly promoted the promotion of Soviet goods. Thus, Glaser reported to Moscow: "due to the fact that the long journey greatly depleted the cattle [cows], we found it necessary to immediately transfer them to the most intensive food... the results of these activities were reflected very quickly, and clean, healthy cattle made a very favorable impression on the general public and specialists." However, in other cases, the PAA could not compensate for the obvious discrepancy between the product condition and market requirements: the participants of the exhibition "were unanimous - both in recognizing the good qualities of Russian cement, and in pointing out completely unsatisfactory packaging-which, unfortunately, was quite true: despite all our efforts to select at least a few suitable ones from the existing batch for exhibition purposes of barrels, we did not succeed" [RGAE, f. 3270, op. 1, d. 641, l. 19-22].

In general, PAA was satisfied with its participation in the Tel Aviv exhibition. Glaser noted that it undoubtedly achieved the following: 1) "familiarized broad segments of the population, especially the Arabs, who had little knowledge of the Russian economy, with its capabilities and the rich range of goods that can be imported to the local market"; 2) "confirmed and increased the interest of commercial circles and individual consumers in the development of the Russian economy." Russian goods"; 3) "popularized our agricultural organizations and ARCOS - as enterprises that can import everything that Palestine needs"; 4)" increased the number of clientele requests " [RGAE, f. 3270, op. 1, d.641, l. 25]. It is possible that the mention of the Arabs was intended to soften the fact of the development of trade and economic relations of the PAA mainly with the Jewish sector of Palestine. At the same time, the information and economic bulletin of the VKL for 1926-1927 noted the limited participation of the "Arab village" in the exhibition of 1925 [RGAE, f. 4004, op. 1, d.206, l. 10]. In addition to the purely commercial benefits, Glaser also pointed out the political significance of PAA's participation in the Tel Aviv exhibition: it "dispelled absurd rumors about Russia's lack of food and the impossibility of conducting trade with it" [RGAE, f. 3270, op. 1, d. 641, l. 25].

PAA has faced a number of challenges in its activities. First of all, it had to enter into intense competition with foreign companies for the Middle East market, as mentioned above. Describing the prospects for selling food products in Palestine, Goltzman noted: "There is a lot of our own here, we can not break through, only partial sales and then with lower prices" [RGAE, f. 3270, op. 1, d. 641, l. 20]. Thus, PAA also competed with local producers. The demand for certain types of Soviet goods in Palestine in the 1920s was constantly declining due to the intensive development of its own Palestinian, primarily Jewish, industry. For example, "with the appearance of its own match products in 1925 and in connection with the establishment of high import duties on imported matches, their importation almost stopped" [RGAE, f. 3514, op. 1, d. 35, l. 15].

A serious problem for PAA was the bad faith of a number of its partners. PAA employees have repeatedly complained about " household agencies that send us goods but do not send us invoices and specifications at the same time." The lack of necessary commodity documents, due to the negligence or elementary inability of PAA suppliers to process goods in accordance with international standards, "prevented the receipt of goods from customs and constantly caused misunderstandings and complications in calculating customs duties." A common occurrence was nedo-

failures and violations of the terms of delivery of goods under concluded contracts, and sometimes outright refusal to fulfill their contractual obligations "due to the lack of goods" [RGAE, f. 3270, op. 1, d. 641, l. 75, 81-82].

PAA was not always able to establish relations with its head office in Moscow. Employees of the latter, as follows from Goltzman's angry letter of September 21, 1925, addressed to them, put forward "additional requirements" to PAA's counterparties, insisted on paying them "special amounts", increased the shipment of goods to one counterparty and reduced it to others. According to Goltzman, the work of the PAA would have been much more effective "if Moscow had not been too clever and instead of any clever philosophical combinations was guided by information from the field" [RGAE, f. 3270, op. 1, d. 641, l. 121].

In relations between Soviet producers and Palestinian "merchants", conflicts often arose over the organization of export operations in Palestine. First of all, Jewish firms and partnerships sought to obtain registration in the USSR, for which they applied to the Concession Department of the NKVT. "We believe that the registration of our company will bring a great revival to the trade relations of the USSR with the Middle East, "said the statement of the Gamankhil joint - stock company, dated August 4, 1926. Palestinian firms expected to have freedom of action in the purchase of" forest materials, cement, etc. at [Soviet] trusts, state agencies for export to Palestine, Egypt, Syria and other Mediterranean countries" [GARF, f. 8350, op. 1, d. 2405, l. 2]. However, the NKVT has never relaxed its control over export operations. Most often, Palestinian firms were granted permits to conduct negotiations with Soviet economic institutions, in case of successful completion of which the firm, at the request of the NKVT, received registration with the Main Concession Committee under the Council of People's Commissars "for the implementation of a specific concluded transaction" [GARF, f. 8350, op. 1, d. 2406, l. 5 (vol.)].

As a mandatory condition for concluding a contract, Jewish firms and partnerships put forward the admission of their receivers to Soviet enterprises [RGAE, f. 6858, op. 1, d. 5, l. 96]. The NKVT rejected these demands whenever possible, but since Soviet economic agencies and foreign trade organizations often supplied goods to Palestine, the quality of which, in Glazer's words, "sharply did not correspond to the quality of exhibition samples" [RGAE, f. 3270, op. 1, d. 641, l. 19], in the case of a large contract, Moscow I made concessions. However, this in turn often caused dissatisfaction on the part of suppliers. So, in November 1925, Ukrexportles sent an eloquent telegram to MOSARKOS: "Acceptance selects no more than 20% of the submitted samples of the best Berezinsky forest. Having identified this situation, we cannot allow such admissions. It's ruinous for us. We refuse to be victims of foreign predators, we hand over the entire forest to our Selmashtrest who need it " [RGAE, f. 3270, op. 1, d. 641, l. 78]. The work of Palestinian receptionists in the USSR often turned into a real ordeal. Goltzman's letter to MOSARKOS dated October 6, 1925, tells the story of " a representative of Gashakhar, G. Chertok, [who] stayed in the USSR for almost 8 months while waiting to receive the timber purchased under the contract of February 18, 1924... Chertok traveled to more than 20 cities of the USSR in search of wood, having spent more than 500 pounds, and in exchange for the purchased wood he accepted 550 cubic meters of Sarapul forest, which also have not yet been delivered to Jaffa " [RGAE, f. 3270, op. 1, d. 641, l. 85].

Despite the efforts of representatives of Palestinian firms, the shipments of Soviet goods they purchased were always defective, and therefore large importers of Soviet building materials, such as the Gamanhil company, applied to the NKVT with a request to allow them to "sell in the USSR parts of materials purchased from trusts and state agencies that turned out to be unsuitable for export."". However, the NKVT resolutely rejected such petitions, as their satisfaction could create serious problems.

"in addition to undesirable conditions for the export of currency, there is an extra competitor in relation to existing enterprises in the USSR" [GARF, f. 8350, op. 1, d. 2405, l. 1-2].

It was not uncommon for Soviet timber export enterprises (Ukrexportles, Lesoexport, etc.) to renegotiate contracts with representatives of Palestinian firms who came to the USSR for their products, which caused confusion in PAA's relations with the latter, but most importantly, in order to make a quick profit in Palestine, Soviet timber exporters competed for the Palestinian market with each other and thereby brought down the Palestinian market. the price of the forest. "We clearly understand," Goltzman wrote to MOSARKOS on July 17, 1925 , " that representatives of the firms with which we have concluded contracts here, who have come from Palestine, go to the forest trusts and negotiate the purchase of timber. Each of these firms seeks to buy in such a way that a competitive firm cannot get the wood it needs for Palestine... The result of these operations will be negative in the future." Goltzman called this state of affairs a " forest swirl." The PAA manager reported to Moscow: "Since the Palestinian forest market is limited, in order to achieve the best prices, it is necessary to sell our pine in such quantities and in such a time frame so as not to create competition in the forest market. We strongly insist on the urgent need to reach an agreement with the NKVT and the Forestry Department of the Supreme Economic Council and achieve a ban on the sale of timber to Palestine without our consent " [RGAE, f. 3270, op. 1, d. 641, l. 235].

Jewish counteragents of Soviet economic agencies and foreign trade organizations sought to sell primarily citrus fruits in the USSR, while Moscow did not consider oranges and lemons to be goods worth spending foreign currency on. Similarly, the insistent offers of Jewish firms to pay for Soviet timber by supplying the USSR with Palestinian citrus fruits were unacceptable to the Soviet leadership. "The entire quota for the import of oranges and lemons to the USSR is set at 1 million rubles, distributed among the relevant organizations," the NKVT noted in this connection, "and in this case, the import of oranges and lemons even for exchange for forest materials is not possible" [GARF, d. 2406, l. 9]. Nevertheless, some Palestinian firms sometimes managed to sell large quantities of citrus fruits to the USSR. As follows from the report submitted to the NKVT in August 1927 by the Society "Pardess", they were " imported into Russia oranges in the amount of 4575 pounds." As if anticipating the indignation of the NKVT, the report reported: "Oranges of the highest brand reached their destination in excellent condition" [GARF, d. 2406, l. 22]. In response, NKVT refused to cooperate with the company.

A serious blow to Soviet trade with Palestine was caused by the closure of the PAA in April 1926 as a result of a series of incidents with the British authorities, the most serious of which was the search of the PAA office by the British. Complaints about obstacles caused by the British administration, which suspects the PAA of "political activities", are contained in almost all PAA communications since its opening. "During the entire existence of [the PAA], in addition to constant nagging [by the British authorities], the system was practiced at every slightest opportunity to cause material losses to ARKOS, [for example] not releasing perishable goods from customs under various pretexts." In some cases, PAA employees managed to overcome the "intrigues" of the British administration. Thus, when the British put forward "clearly illegal obstacles to the import of our cattle (even imported ones), as a result of which most of the sent party returned", the PAA eventually managed to secure "certain fundamental achievements important for our future work" in the "struggle for the right to import Russian cattle" to Palestine [RGAE, f. 3270, op. 1, d. 641, l. 16, 25].

On March 13, 1926, the British authorities raided PAA. The circumstances of this incident are detailed in Glaser's report: "A thorough search was carried out in the fireproof cash register, cabinets and accounting desks, and then in the desk at which I worked.-

I'm melting. Much attention was paid to my correspondence with T. Goltzman and correspondence sent to the USSR." Despite the fact that no incriminating PAA materials were found during the search, Glazer "was ordered to be expelled on March 24." Glazer's expulsion meant the de facto termination of the PAA's activities. According to Goltzman, who was in Moscow at the time, this is exactly what the British authorities were aiming for: "The Palestinian government considered it necessary to notify that it had no obstacles to the work of ARKOS, and the expulsion was directed personally against T. Glazer, who was suspected of political affairs. By doing so, the Palestinian authorities seem to want to deflect accusations of his true intentions and avoid paying damages resulting from the closure of [PAA]." Goltsman categorically rejected the version about the "political affairs" of his assistant, emphasizing: "he is even non-partisan" [RGAE, f. 3270, op. 1, d. 549, l. 16, 25].

During the time remaining before his expulsion, Glazer looked for ways out of this situation. Relying on his business reputation and authority, he was able to enlist the support of the" Jaffa Chamber of Commerce, Banks and Merchants", which sent representatives to Jerusalem on March 19 with a statement of support for Glazer. It is important to note that in Jerusalem, this deputation was joined by a representative of the Vaad Leumi (National Council) of the Jewish-Palestinian community, which indicated the interest of the latter's leadership in preserving the PAA. As a result, the Assistant High Commissioner, General Symes, on the same day postponed the expulsion of Glazer "without a certain period of time" [RGAE, f. 3270, op. 1, d. 549, l.25(vol.)].

However, on March 22, Glazer received a telegram from Mosarkos signed by Goltzman: "As a protest against the outrageous actions of the authorities, Deputy People's Commissar of Trade Moisey Frumkin ordered to immediately liquidate the ARKOS cases in Egypt, Syria, and Palestine and leave for Moscow." Over the next twenty - four hours, Glaser tried to get MOSARKOS to urgently send a "responsible representative" of ARCOS to Palestine in order to preserve the PAA: "In my opinion," he telegraphed to Moscow, " the liquidation of [PAA] by ourselves is an unacceptable step, interrupting transactions, trade relations, on which a lot of struggle and money was spent." [RGAE, f. 3270, op. 1, d. 549, l. 20-21]. The last word was left to the NKVT: by its decision in April 1926, the PAA was liquidated [RGAE, f. 3270, op. 1, d. 695, l. 1].

The incident that led to the closure of the PAA should be considered in the context of Soviet-British relations, the deterioration of which became apparent in the spring of 1926. The search of the PAA was the first link in a chain of incidents, among which were the "raid" on the Soviet mission in Beijing on April 6, 1927 (organized, according to Moscow, by the British) and the" raid " of the British police on the London office of ARKOS on May 12, 1927, which led to the denunciation of the Anglo-Soviet trade agreement of 1921.

The entry of Soviet foreign trade organizations and household businesses into the Palestinian market occurred at the most favorable time for the development of the Palestinian economy, when it was experiencing a period of rapid growth after the crisis of 1922-1923, but had not yet faced the crisis of 1927-1928. While Zionism was branded in the Soviet Union as "an instrument of capitalist colonization of Palestine" and "a tool for suppressing the Arab revolutionary movement," virtually all counterparties of Soviet foreign trade organizations were part of the infrastructure of the "Jewish national home." It is the Jewish sector of the Palestinian economy, which is in dire need of construction materials (for the construction of industrial facilities and roads) and forest materials (primarily for packaging export products - mainly citrus crops), that became the main consumer of Soviet goods.

The establishment and development of trade relations between the USSR and the" Jewish national home " in Palestine was mutually beneficial. The Soviet leadership, as well as the leaders of the "Jewish state on the road", faced the task of creating a "Jewish state on the road".

the economic base of the "new society", the solution of which was impossible without establishing foreign economic relations. Neither Palestine for the USSR nor the USSR for Palestine were strategic trading partners, and yet each side played a certain role in the development of its partner's economy. In addition, the establishment and development of trade relations between Moscow and the new Jewish-Palestinian community contributed to the establishment of socio-political, scientific and cultural ties between them, and ultimately to the recognition of the "proletarian state" and the "Jewish state on the road" of each other.

list of literature

Axelrod M. M. Palestine // Eastern countries. Economic Handbook, vol. 1. Middle East, Moscow: Publishing House of the All-Union-Eastern Chamber of Commerce, 1931.

Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (WUA RF). f. 04. Op. 31. D. 52402.

Bogen D. Bely terror v Palestine [White Terror in Palestine], Moscow: MOPR Central Committee Publishing House, 1926.

State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF). F. 8350. Op. 1.

Gurko-Kryazhin V. A. National liberation movement in the Middle East. Part 1. Syria and Palestine, Cilicia, Mesopotamia and Egypt. Moscow: All-Russian Scientific Association of Oriental Studies under the People's Commissariat for Nationalities, 1923.

Dokumenty vneshnoi politiki SSSR (DVP SSSR) [Documents of Foreign Policy of the USSR (DVP SSSR)], vol. VII, Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1963.

Dokumenty vneshnoi politiki SSSR (DVP SSSR), vol. IX, Moscow: Politizdat, 1965.

Makeev D. A. Sovetsko-palestvenskiye torgovye otnosheniya v mezhvoinennoi period [Soviet - Palestinian trade Relations in the Interwar period]. Politika velikikh derzhav na Balkanakh i Mneistve Vostoke (1932-1945). Sb.nauchnykh trudov. Sverdlovsk: Ural State University Publ., 1984.

Palestine / / World Professional Movement. Spravochnik Profinterna [Handbook of the Profintern], Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatelstvo, 1927.

Palestine // Eastern countries. Economic Handbook, Moscow: Publishing House of the All-Union-Eastern Chamber of Commerce, 1929.

Russian State Archive of Economics (RGAE).

Russian State Archive of Socio-political History (RGASPI). f. 272. Op. 1. d. 462.

Trade and Industry (Palestine) No. 8-9. June 13, 1924

Shapovalov M. S. [Jewish economic colonization of Palestine in 1920-1929]. 2010. N 1.

Shchevslsv S. S. Palestine under the mandate of Great Britain (1920-1948). Simferopol: Tavriya Plus Publ., 1999.

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