Moldavian research base of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Institute of History, Language and Literature. History and Archeology Sector. Central State Historical Archive of the Moldavian SSR. State Publishing House of Moldova. Chisinau. 1949. 117 p.
The documentary legacy of P. I. Bagration is still waiting for its researcher. Numerous materials deposited as a result of his versatile and vigorous activity are scattered in many repositories of our country. The need for a monographic publication of these documents is long overdue. Therefore, the reviewed collection will attract the attention of all those who are interested in the military past of the Russian people.
The collection contains documentary materials from the fund of senators of Divans of Moldavia and Wallachia, stored in the Central State Historical Archive of the Moldavian SSR. These materials supplement the documentation of the collection "General Bagration "(Ogiz. 1945). A number of documents in this publication are reprinted from the latest collection.
The materials of this publication cover the period from July 1, 1809 to March 15, 1810.1 The collection consists of five sections: "Appointment of P. I. Bagration to the Moldavian army"; "Orders, orders and correspondence of P. I. Bagration concerning the army"; "Issues of administration of Moldavia and Wallachia"; "Attitude to the population"; "Assistance of the population of Moldavia and Wallachia to the Russian troops"; "Departure of P. I. Bagration from the Soviet Union". Moldovan Army".
Of particular value are Bagration's original documents about the capture by Russian troops of the fortresses Girsovo (N 9), Brailov (N 30), Mangaly, Kuzgun (N 14), about the victory over the Turks at Rassevat (N 11). Interesting materials show Bagration's concern for his subordinates (NN 17, 26, 33), about providing the army with food and fodder (NN 18, 26, 69, 81).
All these documents characterize Bagration as a sensitive educator of the troops, a caring military leader who does not forget to answer officers and lower ranks for differences in the "actions of the military" (No. 5), and at the same time as a demanding and strict commander when it comes to the glory and victories of Russia. In this respect, Bagration's order on the Moldavian Army of December 30, 1809 on preparations for the spring offensive is interesting. "If," we read in it, "the opening of a new campaign is more important than any of my hopes, if there are such shortcomings in the army or regiment and its crew, the correction of which was missed by the negligence of the commanders, then the perpetrators will be held accountable and punished in proportion to the harm that the service may suffer from their negligence" (No. 34).
A loyal son of the motherland, Bagration pursued a policy of friendship in the principalities. This can be seen, in particular, from his letter to the head of the Divans of Moldavia and Wallachia, S. S. Kushnikov: "... in relation to the Austrian government, I intend to strictly observe the interests of Russia... On the other hand, I consider it necessary to caress the people" (No. 45).
Bagration considered the local population to be close to Russia, " ... unanimity and uniform dispositions from ancient times laid the foundation for communication between Russians and the inhabitants of the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia," we read in Bagration's letter (No. 46). He emphasized the fraternal ties between the Russian and Bulgarian peoples: "Numerous victories won over the enemy in a very short time brought us closer to those countries that are inhabited by real Bulgarian philistines, who fully feel the full burden of the Turkish yoke and have discovered it from time immemorial... their loyalty and commitment to Russia "(No. 60). Bagration called for respect for Bulgarians, Moldovans and Greeks-
1 Dates are given in the old style.
kam, "not to drive them out of their homes, but... to put them in them" (N 52).
Bagration provided assistance to the Serbs who wanted to "take up arms to defend their fatherland against the Turks" (No. 65). He acted as a defender of the local population, languishing under the Turkish yoke. "No one, from the first boyar to the last subject," Bagration wrote, " from an old man covered with gray hair, to an infant who feeds on his mother's milk, from a widow who has acquired sustenance from the labors of her ancestors and her husband who has died, to her youngest grandchild who adorns herself with one innocence, no one, I say, has enjoyed the first good of humanity. life, honor and property" (No. 46).
The published materials paint Bagration as an ardent patriot of his homeland, confident in the bravery and invincibility of the Russian troops. A faithful disciple of the great Suvorov, who regarded "victory as the enemy of war," Bagration saw victory as the path to peace, emphasizing that war " inevitably entails the ruin of the earth "(No. 46). Proud of Russia's victories, Bagration wrote about the actions of Russian troops in the war against Turkey: "Despite the great efforts of the Turks, they never managed to gain any advantage over us, or use any transport or furuya from the army's baggage train. On the contrary, everywhere and in all attempts, the enemy found only his own death" (N 82.). True to Suvorov's precepts, Bagration believed that "soldiers are dear". He wrote, talking about the" happy success " of Russian weapons: "More than this, it is a consolation to me that all the victories over the enemy are in the field, that all the sieges... fortresses were associated with a very insignificant loss of brave Russian soldiers" (ibid.).
This is how the materials of the collection of the Commander-in-Chief of the Moldovan Army Bagration are drawn.
Unfortunately, the collection is not without drawbacks.
First of all, it should be noted that the published documents do not fully cover the topic. The compilers should have made more use of the materials of the Central State Military Historical Archive of the USSR. For example, the collection does not sufficiently reflect the heroism of the army commanded by Bagration. Meanwhile, there are documents about the battle of Rassevat, which Bagration wrote about: "My weak pen will never be able to fully portray the zeal, the courage and the bravery that all the troops have shown in the present case... Everyone tried to be the first, and everyone tried to surpass their colleagues in showing unlimited zeal... fearlessness and activity in the performance of the duty of one's duty... fatherland"2 . Bagration was full of pride for the "invincible Russian army"3 . Describing the natural obstacles on the way to Rassevat, he concludes: "... all these difficulties have been overcome by the firmness and zeal characteristic of a single Russian army. " 4
Bagration's reports on the victories of the Russian troops at Zhurzhey, Rassevat, Kuzgun, Kyustendzhi, and Silistria should be included in the collection .5 They would significantly supplement the materials published in it.
The collection does not contain any documents showing Bagration's attitude towards foreign mercenaries in the Russian service, whom he considered as adventurers who came to Russia for easy profit. He spoke of them with anger. Interesting is Bagration's autograph to Arakcheev dated September 2, 1809, in which he wrote about the appointment of foreigners to him: "I need Russians, not foreigners; they are never used to serving one, but always serve many." 6 In another letter from Bagration to Arakcheev, dated November 23, 1809, we read: "... they (foreigners - V. V.) make soft beds, but we sleep hard. " 7
The collection does not reflect the materials that tell about the difficulties that Alexander I and his entourage created for Bagration. A blind reference to them in document No. 29 is not sufficient. It is known that when he was appointed commander-in-chief of the Moldavian Army, Bagration received a "decisive order" from Alexander "to use all possible efforts to make strong and rapid movements against the enemy on the right side of the Danube"8 . Bagration fulfilled the "highest will", but this put the Russian troops in extremely difficult conditions. The increasing number of patients who could not be transported to hospitals due to lack of means of transportation, difficulties in supplying the army, the inability to build dugouts "in the bare steppe, where you can not find even twigs" - all this threatened the Moldovan army with "final extermination" 9. But Alexander was not easily persuaded to change his mind.
Bagration wrote to Arakcheev on November 23, 1809: "It is in vain that you are deceived and flattered for our ruin... it's bad to fall in love with one position. I ask for one favor: give me a free will or liberty... I'm the closest here and I can see better, but what's the use of all of you interfering? " 10
Only as a result of his perseverance and energy did Bagration get a resolution
2 Central State Military Historical Archive (TSVIA), 2927 f. VUA, l. 90 and ob.
3 Ibid., l. 169.
4 Ibid., l. 162 and vol.
5 See ibid., ll. 115-118, 123-127, 164 and vol., 166 - 168 and vol.
6 Ibid., l. 144 and vol.
7 Ibid., l. 348 and vol.
8 Ibid., 2941, l. 92.
9 Ibid., d. 2729, ll. 305 and vol., 309-311 and vol.
10 Ibid., 2927, pl. 345 and ob., 348.
Alexandra move with her army to the left bank of the Danube 11 .
The materials of the Central State Military-Historical Archive show Bagration's desire to rid the Serbs of the Turkish yoke. In his address to" all the brave Serbian people "of February 18, 1810, we read:" Now is the time when all the Serbian army, animated by faith and love for their fatherland, armed with the spirit of bravery, should unite with the invincible Russian army to defeat the proud tyrants of Serbia and to establish its prosperity, which has hitherto been achieved." and the streams of Serbian blood were not able to acquire " 12 .
There are significant omissions in some documents. So, in the report to Alexander of September 6, 1809 (No. 12), Bagration's very valuable statement about the mercenary policy of England in the East is omitted. Bagration pointed out that the British "pour their gold everywhere to stir up war wherever possible on solid ground and thereby achieve their only own benefits, sacrificing in any case their allies, as has already been proven by repeated examples of Fr... the inhabitants of the Turkish Empire have no enmity against the Russians and cannot have any, having been in friendship and good agreement before, and even in alliance with Russia, and that is why this war was ignited by a single Ministry of the Porte, led by the tricks and gold of the British " 13 .
Document No. 15 omits Bagration's account of the capture of the fortress of Mangalia by Russian troops, which is "particularly important because Constantinople is always supplied from there with salt, coal, and various supplies." 14 Without this, Bagration's intention to "cause a shock in Constantinople itself through the capture of Mangalia..."is incomprehensible .15
The disadvantages of the collection include the publication of most documents from copies, which in some cases led to their distortion (NN 6 16, 8 17).
There are repetitions in the collection. So, in Bagration's report to Alexander of August 19, 1809 (No. 6), the circumstances of the capture of the fortress of Machin by Russian troops are described in detail. Therefore, it is superfluous to include Bagration's letter to Senator Kushnikov with an abridged version of the same (No. 7).
The collection should not have included a poor-quality copy of Kushnikov's letter to the Moldavian Sofa (No. 13) with a retelling of Bagration's original letter about the victory of Russian troops over the Turks at Rassevat (No. 11).
There are unspoken text gaps in documents (NN 43, 48, 50, 54, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60); bold words are also omitted (N 50). There are grammatical and syntactic errors (N 17), half-written words (N 24).
Please note that the document headers are too large (NN). 4, 5, 17, 23, 28, 42, 44, 52, 58, 60, 81) and in some cases for their inaccuracy (NN 19, 20, 21, 64).
There are no comments on materials in the collection. A name index and an index of such words that require clarification as discretion (N 6), bayraktar, kirjali (N 12), karutsi (N 26), dizhmerit, vinerit, oerit (N 46), vistear, vatavy, sameshi, zapchii, tsynuty, vornik, logophet, spatar are not given to it. armash, aga (N 47), muders, skutelniki, novices (N 48), parkalabiya (N 72). The use of the collection is difficult due to the lack of a geographical index, as well as plans and maps, although the Central State Military Historical Archive contains the original Bagration plan for taxation by Russian troops of Machin 18 .
The incompleteness of the collection noted by us - the absence in it of the most important documents of the Central State Military Historical Archive of the USSR on the heroism of the Russian army, on the attitude of the tsar and his entourage to Bagration, etc., as well as the carelessness in its design by the compilers - these are the main shortcomings of the reviewed collection.
11 See CVIA, f. VUA, 2941, ll. 8, 93 and vol.
12 Ibid., ll. 77 and vol. 78.
13 Ibid., 2927, l. 49 and vol. (The discharge is mine. - V. V. ).
14 TSGVIA, f. VUA, d. 2927, l. 100.
15 Ibid., l. 102.
16 See ibid., l. 6.
17 See ibid., l. 27.
18 See ibid., l. 11.
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