The composition of migration flows from China to the CIS and trends in their volumes are considered using the example of the two largest post-Soviet republics. The article describes the contribution of two main categories of migrants-trade workers and contract workers-to the economy of host countries. It is shown that the main contingent of people coming from China are temporary migrants. The article examines the challenges arising from the presence of a large number of Chinese migrants, such as the problem of competition in the labor market and the question of the"demographic threat". Taking into account the economic policy of the PRC, the economic interests of Russia and Kazakhstan, and the state of public opinion, a number of forecast generalizations are made that are relevant for both post-Soviet republics.

Keywords: Chinese migration, post-Soviet space, competition, "Chinese demographic threat".

The study of Chinese migration to the former republics of the USSR began almost simultaneously with its collapse and the formation of new sovereign states on its territory. At present, the material accumulated by scientists, despite the lack of statistics and factual information, makes it possible to turn to a comparative analysis of migration flows in order to gradually build a general picture of Chinese migration in the post-Soviet space, place the phenomenon of migration in a broader context of a particular country, and enrich the understanding of current problems related to the activities of migrants.

The branches of Chinese migration to the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan (ROK) are the most significant in terms of size and dynamism, and at the same time the most studied. This article will focus on them: various types of economic migration, their contribution to the economy of the two countries, as well as the challenges that arise that require serious attention from the authorities and the public.

ECONOMIC ACTIVITY OF MIGRANTS

Number and composition of arrivals from China

In Russia, accurate statistical records of international migrants, including Chinese, are not established, and there are sometimes significant discrepancies between data from different agencies. In the expert community, the most reliable estimate is 200-400 thousand, with a maximum of 500 thousand people1. The advantage of this estimate is that it is derived from the analysis as the sum of estimates of the number of Chinese in various cities and regions of the country. In this assessment, we also include illegal migrants, i.e. those who have violations of labor laws, who have exceeded the period of stay in the country, etc. According to Russian experts ' estimates, in the mid-2000s there were 65-70 thousand Chinese migrants annually in the Far East [Larin V. L., 2011, p. 108]. According to the Association of Chinese Citizens of Vladivostok, their number was approaching 200 thousand. [Vladivostok News, 2007].

1 As far as we know, V. G. Gelbras was the first to estimate the number of Chinese migrants in Russia at 200-450 thousand [Gelbras, 2001, p. 39-40].

page 107
The number of Chinese migrants increases over time. According to our calculations, based on statistics from the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service (FSB PS), due to the difference between the number of annual entries and exits of Chinese citizens for the period 2000-2012, the excess of entry over exit was 181.6 thousand people. The intensity of the migration flow in both directions is also increasing. In 2012, it reached its maximum: 978,998 entries from China to Russia and 978,859 exits in the opposite direction (Poland and Finland were ahead of non-CIS countries). However, in recent years, the increase in the number of migrants from China has slowed down, which is due, firstly, to the global financial and economic crisis and, secondly, to the policy of the Russian government aimed at limiting the participation of foreigners in retail trade. The difference between the number of entries and exits in 2010, 2011, and 2012 was 183, -1413, and 929 people, respectively, whereas previously it was estimated in the tens of thousands annually [Population size and migration..., 2001, 2013].

The number of labor migrants registered with the Federal Migration Service (FMS) of the Russian Federation also increased during the 1990s-2000s and reached a maximum of 281.7 thousand people, or 11.6% of the total number of registered migrants, in 2008 [Labor and Employment in Russia, 2009, p.302]. However, a significant number of migrants avoid registering with the Federal Migration Service (FMS).

The flow of arrivals from China is almost entirely made up of temporary labor migrants. This is confirmed at least by the fact that in 2000-2008 only 2.9 thousand people arrived from China for permanent residence, while the growth of migrants from Russia to China in this category was negative - 8.99 thousand. Over the next two years, 1,399 people arrived, but the departure for permanent residence is not indicated [Number and migration of the population in 2009, 2010, pp. 88-93].

In Kazakhstan, too, it is not yet possible to talk about accurate statistical accounting of all categories of Chinese citizens arriving and staying in the country, and data from various departments - the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of the Population, the Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan — on statistics have discrepancies. Nevertheless, data on border crossings of the Border Service of the National Security Committee (NSC) and data on registration of Chinese citizens in local departments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan allow us to determine the quantitative framework for the number of Chinese citizens in the country.

Just like in Russia, the number of Chinese citizens entering Kazakhstan is increasing every year. According to the statistics of the National Security Committee, the number of crossings of the Kazakh-Chinese border has increased tenfold over the past 10 years. In 2008, 191,223 Chinese citizens entered Kazakhstan, in 2010 - 134.9 thousand, in 2011 - already 161.1 thousand.2
There is a significant gap between the data of the PS of the National Security Committee, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Labor of the Republic of Kazakhstan. For example, in the aforementioned 2008, the Ministry of Internal Affairs registered 46,370 Chinese citizens, and the number of officially employed people, according to the reports of the Ministry of Labor, was 10,104 [Ministry of Labor..., 2013(1)]. According to experts, these discrepancies are explained not only by legal reasons (those who arrive for less than 5 calendar days have the right not to register; not all migrants come for the purpose of obtaining work), but, as in Russia, by evasion of registration or its extension.

The total number of Chinese migrants in Kazakhstan, as in the Russian Federation, is determined only by expert estimates. According to the Chinese side's estimates, in 2009 Kazakhstan had

2 Hereafter, data from the Border Service of the National Security Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan on border crossing and permanent relocation to Kazakhstan were kindly provided by the Statistics Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Astana, March 2013.

page 108
About 300 thousand Chinese immigrants are employed in various sectors of the economy, mainly in Alma-Ata, Astana and Aktobe region [Hasakesitan..., 2009].

One of the specific features of Kazakhstan is that since 1991, the main direction of the state migration policy has been the repatriation of ethnic Kazakhs (Rmans) to Kazakhstan from various CIS countries and outside the CIS, including from China. In total, according to the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of the Population of the Republic of Kazakhstan, as of January 1, 2011, about 81.7 thousand people arrived from China. 9.9% of the total number of Kazakhs who arrived in the Republic of Kazakhstan [Ministry of Labor..., 2011]. According to the Statistics Agency, during the period 1999-2012 (January-October), 43,841 people arrived from China for permanent residence, including: 97.0% - Kazakhs, 1.4% - Chinese, 0.2% - Uyghurs and 1.4% - representatives of other nationalities (Koreans, Dungans, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, Russians et al.) [Ethnodemographic Yearbook of Kazakhstan, 2013]. Not all Kazakh migrants accepted the citizenship of the Republic of Kazakhstan, many retained the citizenship and passports of the People's Republic of China. By the way, oralmans make up a significant proportion of citizens traveling in the opposite direction - from Kazakhstan to China to visit relatives or solve business issues that they develop with their fellow tribesmen from the border Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR) of the PRC.

Like the Russian Far East, Kazakhstan attracts migrants from neighboring regions of the PRC. Russia-almost exclusively from Heilongjiang Province in northeastern China, Kazakhstan - from Xinjiang in northwestern China. However, the migration flow from XUAR to Kazakhstan is ethnographically diverse: its composition is represented in addition to the Han by Kazakhs, Uyghurs, Dungans, Koreans, Uzbeks, etc., while the flow from China to the Far East is ethnically almost homogeneous: along with the Han, there are only a small number of Koreans from the Yanbian district and Shengheng Buryats. In Kazakhstan, Han people predominate in some categories of labor migration, such as officially contracted labor, while non-Han people predominate in other types of migration, such as trade migration, and when moving to a permanent place of residence (Sadovskaya, 2012).

Sectoral structure of migrant employment

The employment structure of Chinese migrants in Russia can be illustrated by the following table.

Table 1

Employment structure of Chinese migrants in Russia, %

page 109
Industries

2005

2009

trading

62.3

33.4

construction

13.6

31.5

agricultural industry

7.6

17.7

manufacturing industry

3.7

6.5

other industries

12.8

10.9

Source: [Zayonchkovskaya, 2011].

Trade migrants from China

The predominant part of Chinese migrants initially, i.e. from the moment of their appearance in the Russian Federation, were merchants, and among them the overwhelming majority were participants in the so-called people's trade. Such a term with a rather vague meaning in China is called "unofficial" (feiguanfang, literally "non-official")

trade. This is a mass trade in consumer goods, which is conducted not by companies created by the authorities of one level or another, but by individual entrepreneurs and "people's organizations" (in other words, private firms). In terms of meaning, this term is close to the Russian concepts of "individual entrepreneurship" and "small and medium-sized businesses". This also includes "shuttles".

Over the years of its existence, China's "people's trade" with Russia has advanced far. The initial barter exchange was replaced by the usual commodity form of trade. A network of intermediaries began to replace the" shuttles " who were carrying their goods, single traders became employees of commercial companies, and small wholesale and wholesale trade appeared. The quality of Chinese products has improved, and its range has become much more diverse: previously it was clothing, shoes, and hats; now it is almost all categories of mass-market goods: from clothing and shoes to household household and complex electronic devices, furniture, etc.

A characteristic feature of Chinese trade has become its concentration in large markets, from where goods coming from China in large quantities are then delivered by both Chinese and local merchants to other cities. In Moscow, such a wholesale shopping center, the largest in Europe, for a long time served as the Cherkizovsky market, which served almost the entire European part of Russia. After its closure in 2009, most of the Chinese and Vietnamese traders who worked there moved to other Moscow markets, and this made it possible to significantly preserve the former retail network.

As can be seen from Table 1, the number of trade migrants significantly decreased by the beginning of the 2010s. This is due to the fact that since 2007, the Russian government has taken a course to oust foreigners from retail trade in the markets and at the same time, judging by some signs, has begun to implement a policy of gradually reducing market trade in general, replacing markets with more modern shopping centers. This circumstance prompted the Chinese authorities to prepare their merchants in Russia for the transition to new forms of trade, so as not to lose the Russian consumer. One of the characteristic fruits of the new trade policy, its symbol was the large business center "Greenwood", built near Moscow with Chinese money.

In Kazakhstan, trade carried out by individual and medium-sized entrepreneurs is called "unorganized" and the customs authorities of the republic do not include it in the statistics of foreign trade turnover. Its scale is indirectly indicated by the difference between the indicators of customs statistics of Kazakhstan and the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, which takes this type of trade into account. In 2011, the bilateral trade turnover was $ 21.3 billion according to Kazakh data, and $ 24.9 billion according to Chinese data, and the difference was $ 3.6 billion.

Just like in Russia, "unorganized" trade in Kazakhstan has evolved from shopping tours and trips of individual "shuttles" to Turkey, China, Poland, and other countries of the world and spontaneous trade in the market to institutionalized forms of trade, when the purchase, transportation, and delivery of goods to the warehouse and store are carried out by specialized intermediary companies. firms. The store owner hires other salespeople to sell products. As a rule, this is an entrepreneur already registered with the state authorities, and not a merchant who buys a one-day patent for small-scale trading on the market. Over the course of two decades, the legal framework for trading business was developed, and its institutional forms changed, although it is still represented today along with small-scale merchants in numerous wholesale and retail markets of the republic.

The phenomenon of large regional markets is common throughout Central Asia. Peculiar "logistics hubs" were formed in the People's Republic of China, in the administrative center of Xinjiang, Urumqi, in Kazakhstan near Alma Ata-at the "Bolashak" ("Flea Market")

page 110
and two more in Kyrgyzstan: on the Dordoi in Bishkek and Karasuu in Osh. It should be noted that China and Kyrgyzstan are member states of the World Trade Organization, which guarantees the free movement of goods, capital and services on their territory. Goods from China in huge volumes enter Kazakhstan in transit through the territory of neighboring Kyrgyzstan and directly through checkpoints (checkpoints) on the border with China [Vasilyeva, 2010]. From these markets, goods are then resold by large wholesalers and small retailers in all corners of Central Asia and Russia. According to some estimates, Chinese entrepreneurs control about half of the commodity and financial turnover of wholesale markets (Ikonnikov, 2007). Today, experts from the World Bank estimate the annual turnover of the largest wholesale and retail markets in Central Asia in billions: Bishkek's Dordoi - 2.8 billion, Alma-Ata's Bolashak - 1.7 billion dollars.RU, 2012].

Attracting Chinese labor

Another significant category of Chinese labor migrants in both Russia and Kazakhstan is specialists and workers who come in an organized manner under contracts. They began to be attracted to work in Russia in the mid-1980s. Data on their number are scarce and contradictory, but all of them indicate a gradual increase in their number, despite certain market fluctuations. According to some Chinese data, which seems to be incomplete, China sent a total of about 320,000 workers to Russia in the 30 years prior to 2007, and at the end of 2007 there were about 31,000 of them [People's Daily, 19.06.2008].

The share of Chinese in the total foreign labor force is particularly noticeable in the Far Eastern region of Russia, which is suffering from a declining population and a shortage of workers not only due to nationwide depopulation, but also due to the migration of local residents to more prosperous areas of the country. Thus, in the Primorsky Territory in 2008, out of 32,575 thousand foreign workers, there were 16,016 Chinese citizens, or 49% [Primorsky Krai: socio-economic indicators..., 2009, p. 68].

The additional value of imported labor for Russia stems from the shortage of working professions that arose as a result of the destruction of the vocational education system during the years of reforms (by the way, the same problem with the shortage of qualified workers is typical for Kazakhstan). The Chinese side is making constant efforts to train workers to work abroad. It is characteristic that the frame of the Federation Tower building in Moscow was built with the participation of Chinese builders, who were invited by the customers after a thorough study of the world's experience in building multi-storey buildings.

However, most of the Chinese workers are low-skilled, and the objects they build are usually residential or public buildings. One of the few exceptions is the section of the Eastern Siberia - Pacific Ocean oil pipeline in Yakutia (note, however, that due to the difficult geological conditions, Chinese workers had to finish training during construction).

In Kazakhstan, as in Russia, the number of workers attracted under the quota increased over time (if we talk about the general trend). In 2008, the number of quota workers from the PRC reached its maximum: 10,104 people, or 22% of the total foreign labor force [Ministry of Labor..., 2013 (1)]. In 2009-2012, due to the economic crisis and a decrease in the total number of foreign workers, the attraction of Chinese labor also decreased. Since in recent years Kazakhstan, in cooperation with the PRC, has intensified the development of its natural resources, primarily oil and gas, and the lack of highly qualified specialists in the country is much stronger than in Russia, as part of the Chinese labor force

page 111
a significant place was taken by qualified employees: managers, engineers, economists, doctors. Specialists and workers from China worked on the construction of the Kumkol-Alashankou and Kenkiyak-Kumkol oil pipelines, the Zhanazhol gas processing plant, the Moinak hydroelectric power station and other production facilities.

Graphi k 1

Dynamics of Chinese labor force attraction to the Republic of Kazakhstan in 1999-2011 (people)

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

306

832

1248

559

854

1457

3238

5008

8095

10104

6858

6877

6379

Source: [Ministry of Labor..., 2013 (2)].

According to media reports, by 2013, about 10 Kazakh-Chinese projects with a total value of $ 5 billion were already being implemented in the oil and gas sector of Kazakhstan, and 4 major joint projects with a total value of more than $ 18 billion are being implemented in the field of energy resources transportation [ITAR-TASS news agency, 2013]. Another important difference between Kazakhstan and Russia: In the Republic of Kazakhstan, Chinese small and medium-sized businesses actively developed not only in trade, but also in production: enterprises for the production and assembly of household appliances, metal-plastic products, and building structures appeared.

During the official visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Kazakhstan in September 2013, 21 contracts were signed for projects totaling more than $ 22 billion. The largest of them is the oil and gas complex, primarily the construction of a new oil refinery. "All projects should be implemented by 2020," the President said. Nazarbayev [HATENGRINEWS.KZ, 2013]. Undoubtedly, the implementation of projects will be accompanied not only by Chinese investments, but also by the supply of equipment from China and the use of Chinese specialists and workers.

Chinese migrants in agriculture in Russia and Kazakhstan

Russian agriculture employs about half as many Chinese workers as construction. They are mainly engaged in the Far East and Eastern Siberia, but gradually reach the European part of Russia. With-

page 112
According to Chinese statistics, in 2006, farmers in Heilongjiang Province alone, the main supplier of labor resources to Russia, cultivated more than 130 thousand hectares of land in these regions, making 35 thousand trips to the Russian Federation [Zhuhe Jiaqiang..., 2006]. Chinese farmers specialize in growing vegetables, melons, and soybeans. A part of soybeans (in 2008 - over 400 thousand tons) is exported to China [Low cost of land lease..., 2009].

From time to time, reports appear in the press about the plans of the Russian authorities to organize large-scale food production for export beyond the Urals, providing vast tracts of arable land to Chinese peasants for this purpose (apparently, in these cases we are talking about long-term leases). If these plans are implemented, the number of Chinese employed in Russian agriculture will significantly increase.

Leasing land to Chinese farmers is also practiced in Kazakhstan. The first mention of the agreement on the lease of 7 thousand hectares of land in the East Kazakhstan region for a period of 10 years refers to 2003. According to reports, a joint venture was established and about 3 thousand rubles were raised. chinese agricultural workers. All projects related to the lease of land by foreign companies cause active protest in Kazakhstan, which happened this time. Official representatives of Kazakhstan have denied the existence of such an agreement, but it is possible that such negotiations were conducted, and preliminary agreements were reached on this issue. The details of this first project are not known for certain even to professionals [Politics of the People's Republic of China at the present stage..., 2005, p. 66].

The next project of land lease by the Chinese side, which was announced by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev. Nazarbayev in December 2009, had a much larger scale: within the framework of this project, already in 2010 it was planned to grow soybeans on the first 10-15 thousand hectares of steppe land, and in general the project covered 1 million hectares [Pannier, 2010]. In economic terms, this form of cooperation can be very beneficial for both China and Kazakhstan in terms of ensuring food security in these countries. Attracting Chinese investment and establishing joint Kazakh-Chinese agricultural enterprises for growing and processing agricultural products are likely to be developed in Kazakhstan in the future, as evidenced by the signing of an agreement on cooperation between China and Kazakhstan in the agricultural sector in Astana in September 2013 [Satpayev, 2013]. It is important to keep this process under control and make it as profitable as possible for Kazakhstan. Unfortunately, information on this sensitive topic is extremely scarce in both Kazakhstan and Russia.

MIGRATION AS A CHALLENGE

The problem of competition

Do Chinese migrants in Russia compete with our compatriots? Whether they are content to fill vacant jobs or displace Russians, taking advantage of their well-known advantages: the low cost of goods and labor, as well as the quality of labor, i.e. their conscientiousness and efficiency.

This is not an easy question to answer. In society, mutually exclusive points of view on the consequences of using the labor of Chinese workers are widespread: some note "an increase in unemployment among the local population", others - "filling the labor shortage". The first one is more common. So, in one of the polls conducted by the All-Russian Center for Public Opinion Research (VTsIOM), she received a majority of votes (58%) with half as many

page 113
the number of votes against this first point of view (26%). In the Far Eastern Federal District, the ratio of votes was almost the same: 63 and 31%, respectively. As for the second point of view on the role of Chinese migration in filling the labor shortage, 40% of respondents were in favor, 38% were against in the country as a whole, and 52% and 35% in the Far Eastern Federal District, respectively (VTsIOM, 2007).

Facts show that in the struggle for a place "under the Russian sun", Chinese migrants are quite capable of gaining the upper hand. For example, in the Far East, the cheapness of Chinese vegetable products makes it unprofitable - if not unprofitable, then less profitable - for wholesalers to purchase and transport cabbage and other vegetables, even from rural areas close to markets, and even in the case of a good harvest and low cost. As a result, local domestic vegetable production is being pushed out of the market under Chinese pressure, with local authorities often suspected of colluding with migrants failing to act.

Another example. In 2007, Transneft invited the Chinese company China Petroleum Pipeline as a subcontractor for the construction of the Eastern Siberia - Pacific Ocean oil pipeline. It was preferred over Russian competitors because of the difference in price: as reported in the press, Russian companies lay a kilometer of the pipeline for 18 million rubles, and the Chinese-for 14 million [Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 25.10.2007]. About two thousand Chinese workers were brought to Russia in batches. The government of Yakutia, which was supposed to run a 170-km-long pipeline between Tynda and Aldan, tried to persuade Transneft to hire 400 local unemployed construction workers (Yakutia has a high unemployment rate), but only received consent for 200 people.

There is a belief in Russia, including among experts, that the cheap Chinese goods that have flooded into the country since the early 1990s have " ruined the national production of consumer goods." Since then, the offensive of Chinese imports has been constantly expanding, covering various types of machinery and equipment that Russia used to produce itself. There was an economic dependence of the Russian Far East on food and industrial supplies from the PRC. However, in addition to competition, other factors that are no less significant have also played a role in the current situation, and complaints should not be addressed primarily to the Chinese side.

In the 1990s, goods imported from China by Chinese and Russian "shuttles" helped to solve the problem of a total commodity shortage. And today, as in the 1990s, Chinese manufacturers occupy the space on the Russian market that the Russian side frees up for them.

The absolute predominance of Chinese goods is also observed in the markets of Kazakhstan and other post-Soviet republics of Central Asia. The scale of deliveries from China is steadily growing. In particular, this applies to one of the leading import items - shoes. In 2012, 280 million pairs of Chinese-made shoes were shipped from Xinjiang to Central Asia (despite the fact that the population of the five countries in the region is about 64 million people) at a total cost of $ 2.2 billion. The share of ROK was 150 million pairs — which is more than 10% more than in the previous year [Xinhua News Agency, 2013]. Chinese manufacturers carefully study consumer demand in the Central Asian market, constantly changing styles, models and colors. Currently, the needs of the domestic market of Kazakhstan are covered by 75% of Chinese - made shoes, about 20% - Turkish and Russian, and a small part is accounted for by shoes from Europe. The volume of domestic footwear production is only 1%, whereas in Soviet times the needs of the Kazakhstan market were covered by 60% by local manufacturers [Myskina, 2008].

page 114
It would, however, be an oversimplification to say that it was the flow of cheap Chinese shoes that led to the decline of the footwear industry in Kazakhstan. The decline occurred for many reasons: lack of investment in the industry, emigration of specialists and workers, retirement of old, experienced personnel, destruction of the secondary special education system, and the resulting shortage of workers in this specialty. In Kazakhstan, raw leather and accessories are more expensive than in China (ironically, a significant part of imports from Kazakhstan to China is unprocessed leather), and the cost of labor is high. The legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan, on the one hand, favors the development of small and medium-sized businesses, on the other hand, it constantly creates new administrative rules that make it difficult for its effective operation. All this together leads to the destruction of local production.

It should be noted that the expansion of Chinese products in Kazakhstan leads not only to the closure of production facilities and an increase in unemployment, but also to the creation of new jobs. In the labor market, business structures are being formed that are engaged in the transportation and sale of Chinese goods. They include Kazakhstani entrepreneurs, salesmen, cashiers, truck drivers, security guards, etc., who are completely dependent on Chinese imports, on the volume and stability of supplies and sales, because this determines earnings, and therefore the financial well-being of their families.

Thus, the reasons for the decline in production in some sectors of the economy of Kazakhstan (in addition to footwear, this is also the textile industry), as in the case of Russia, cannot be reduced to the consequences of Chinese commodity expansion. To a greater extent, this decline is related to the domestic economic policy of our states, including in relation to small and medium-sized businesses.

China's "demographic threat"

It has long been established that there is no Chinese "demographic expansion" as such in Russia. Even the small set of facts that we gave above, in the section on the number of migrants from the PRC, is enough to refute the mythologized ideas about Chinese migration that are widespread in Russian society. Such statements, and they can often be found in many publications of the mass media, are reduced to the following statements: there are "millions of Chinese" in Russia, including "in an illegal situation", "in the taiga thickets"; Chinese in large numbers "secretly cross the state border to our side"; they are not allowed to leave the country. the number of" rapidly increasing " [Larin A. G., 2009, pp. 318-340].

In order to refute these "myths", we will add to the above information about the number of migrants and their growth rates: The Russian-Chinese border is guarded and controlled on both sides, and there is close cooperation between border guards and other security agencies of the two countries. In addition, the Chinese authorities are directly interested in not giving unnecessary reasons for talking about the "Chinese threat".

This shows, in particular, the fact that both countries are interested in strategic partnership. Therefore, it is difficult to imagine that Beijing would allow its relations with Moscow to be destabilized for the sake of demographic expansion into its territory, while its political will is aimed precisely at strengthening bilateral relations. Nevertheless, the spontaneous, uncontrolled development of cross-border migration processes, coupled with the growing economic presence of China in the Russian Far East, can lead to quite tangible undesirable consequences for the host country. In the case of China, Russian public opinion is concerned about a number of circumstances that, under certain conditions, can become a prerequisite for unfavorable changes in the economic and ethno-demographic spheres.

page 115
These prerequisites are: first, China's natural great interest in exploiting the natural resources of Siberia; second, no less interest in the Russian market for mass consumption goods and food; third, China's huge integrated national power; and fourth, an integral part of this power is its gigantic demographic potential that exists in the Russian Federation. in the face of a shortage of critical natural resources and multi-million-dollar unemployment, this is in sharp contrast to the situation in the Russian Far East, which is experiencing a prolonged economic crisis and catastrophic depopulation. All this is superimposed on the general atmosphere of migrant phobia, which arose as a reaction to the unexpected influx of migrants to Russia after the collapse of the USSR. Xenophobia, which was provoked by the loss of the Soviet Union's international position and spread to the migrant population, also played a role in creating this atmosphere.

In Kazakhstan, the demographic situation is not as dramatic as in Russia: the decline in the number is observed only among the Slavic part of the population-Russians, Belarusians, Ukrainians, and among Kazakhs and other Turkic-speaking ethnic groups, the birth rate is quite high. The problem of Kazakhstan is different: the lack of highly qualified specialists in almost all spheres of the national economy, caused by large-scale emigration processes and "brain drain", the outflow of the Russian-speaking population, in the 1990s. It is only partially covered by personnel from China. However, Kazakhstan is in the zone of the same geo-economic interests of China and feels the proximity of the same facets of its power as Russia, and therefore there is also concern in Kazakhstan about Chinese "demographic expansion", which, according to many in the republic, is accompanied by Beijing's economic offensive.

This is also true for other Central Asian countries bordering the PRC. "Today, the problem of Chinese migration seriously worsens the nature of relations between China and the states of the region," notes K. L. Syroezhkin, a well - known Kazakh sinologist [Syroezhkin, 2012, p.70].

Attitudes towards migrants are clearly reflected in sociological studies, which, despite all the obvious and implicit differences in methods, allow us to compare the answers to similar questions and get a more accurate vision of the problem. For example, one of the VTsIOM surveys (2007) in the Russian Federation and the 2007 and 2012 surveys in Kazakhstan (Sadovskaya, 2013) showed comparable patterns (Table 2).

Table 2

Attitudes towards Chinese migrants in Russia and Kazakhstan (% of respondents)

Russia

Kazakhstan

What is your attitude towards Chinese migrants? What kind of people are they?

How do you feel about migrants from China?

2007

2007

2012

900 people were interviewed

588 people were interviewed

544 people were interviewed

Very good + good

11

Very good + good

26

23

Ordinary shares

53

It doesn't matter

55

44

So-so + unpleasant

33

Bad + very bad

18

31

I find it difficult to answer

3

I find it difficult to answer

1

0

Source: [VCIOM; Sadovskaya, 2013].

page 116
As Table 2 shows, more than half of the respondents in each of the two countries do not feel hostility towards visitors from China, and this fact is quite convincing evidence that the level of migrant phobia towards the Chinese is low. As for the relatively large number of negative responses, he should not be surprised. This is due not only to the alarmist sentiments discussed above, but also to the unwillingness to have strong competitors in the neighborhood, and dissatisfaction with the participation of Chinese migrants in the shadow economy and the presence of illegal migrants. In Kazakhstan, the large pay gap between local and foreign workers, including Chinese workers, is particularly stressful.

There are also some respondents who, as our surveys show, do not like that " migrants occupy our space on the streets, in transport, etc."; some "do not like their human qualities, demeanor"; others simply "do not like migrants, and that's all". Extremely negative attitudes towards the Chinese presence are quite rare.

The question of migrants ' use of land perceived as the visible embodiment of national wealth and sovereignty evokes special emotions among both Russians and Kazakhstanis. Short-term rental of agricultural land by Chinese farmers and their seasonal visits have already become a common phenomenon in the Russian Federation, and discontent is caused not so much by the fact of their presence as by their use of banned pesticides, which is not controlled by the Russian administration. However, when it comes to the long-term lease of land, i.e., in fact, its temporary alienation and some kind of colonization, there is a mass protest.

So, in 2006, the leaders of the Nizhny Novgorod region, at the suggestion of the Chinese side, decided to host farmers from the PRC for growing vegetables and breeding fish, providing them with a lease for forty years of the corresponding agricultural land. The attractiveness of the idea was directly related to the presence of depopulated rural areas in the region: during the years of reforms, the population of the region decreased to 600 thousand people, having decreased by almost 100 thousand.

However, the initiative of the authorities encountered serious resistance from below, protest actions began, and critical materials appeared in the press. A group of Nizhny Novgorod residents sent a letter to the governor asking him to abandon the plan for the mass arrival of Chinese people, noting that this would lead to competition in the labor market, increase interethnic and social tensions, and finally to the settling of Chinese peasants on Russian land and the subsequent growth of the Chinese diaspora. Several deputies of the State Duma and the regional Legislative Assembly spoke in unison with the authors of the letter. In the end, the regional administration was forced to stop attracting Chinese farmers to the region [Vedomosti, 09.10.2006; NTA-PRIVOLZHYE, 2006].

Similarly, in Kazakhstan, attempts to use land by Chinese companies cause protests in the Kazakh public: alarmist publications in the media, rallies at the Consulate General of the People's Republic of China in Alma-Ata, petitions to the President of the People's Republic of China Hu Jintao, etc. [Mavlony, 2010]. Well-known public figure Bulat Abilov at a protest rally against plans to lease 1 million hectares of land to China published truly frightening numbers. It is interesting that he calculated how many Chinese will be required to cultivate such an area, what will be the growth rate of their settlement due to the appearance of offspring, and concluded: "In 50 years there will be 50 million Chinese in Kazakhstan, and this will be the end. It is necessary to stop the plan proposed by Nazarbayev! " [Pannier, 2010].

The post-Soviet space is China's most important source of natural resources and a major market for mass-market goods. Accordingly

page 117
Chinese migrants work in commodity distribution networks, exploitation of natural resources (forestry and agriculture), and construction. "Colonization" of the post-Soviet territories is not one of Beijing's strategic goals, although obtaining agricultural land leases, especially on a long-term (decades-long) basis, is sometimes regarded in public opinion as the first step in this direction.

The mass consciousness of the peoples inhabiting the post-Soviet space does not accept such steps, since people have a negative attitude to the idea of settling Chinese migrants. However, it is tolerant, although not very enthusiastic, of migrants staying on a temporary basis.

Under these conditions, it is possible to predict further expansion of attracting migrants from China on a temporary basis, especially in the case of new large-scale joint industrial and infrastructure projects in the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan. At the same time, as Russia continues to lose its qualified personnel, the option of Kazakhstan, which already attracts such personnel from China, along with thousands of low-skilled workers, as well as businessmen, becomes more and more likely for it. With a massive increase in the number of migrants, the agenda will include establishing more precise control over their activities and forming a tolerant attitude towards migrants among the local population.

list of literature

Vasilyeva V. Zone for your friends. URL: www.rcport.kg/ussr/1296. 25.07.2010 (02.09.2011).

Vedomosti.

VTSIOM: All-Russian Center for Public Opinion Research. Пресс-выпуск № 773. 20.09.2007. URL: http://wciom.ru/arkhiv/tcmatichcskii-arkhiv/item/singlc/8844.html (220.09.2007).

Gslbras V. G. Kitayskaya real'nost ' Rossii [The Chinese Reality of Russia]. Moscow: Muravey Publ., 2001.

Zhuhe jiaqiang Zhong E laou izo he zuo (How to strengthen Sino-Russian cooperation on labor services). URL: http://www.crc.mofcom.gov.cn/cnvcb/crc/info/Articlc.jsp?a_no=39064&col_no=18U (04.08.2006).

People's Daily.

Zayonchkovskaya Zh. A. Russia and China: Partnership in the Labor market. URL: http://www.baroming.ru/ library/Zaionchkovskaya.ppt#1 (25.06.2011).

ITAR-TASS NEWS AGENCY. Kazakhstan believes in the realization of the" Chinese dream " in China. http://ncws.mail.ru/ inworld/kazakhstan /politics/12637784/?frommail=1 (07.04.2013).

Xinhua News Agency. In 2012, 280 million pairs of Chinese-made shoes were delivered to Central Asia through the Xinjiang border crossing. URL: http://russian.ts.cn/xinjiang/contcnt/2013-01/28/contcnt 7730410.htm (05.03.2013).

EEYORE CHNTRAS1A.RU. http://www.centrasia.ru/ncwsA. php?st=1352191980.(06.11.2012).

EEYORE THNGR1NEWS.KZ. Astana and Beijing have agreed to build an oil refinery in Kazakhstan. URL: http://tcngrincws.kz/markcts/astana-i-pckin-dogovorilis-postroit-npz-na-tcrritorii-kazahstana-241242/ (07.09.2013).

Ikonnikov A. Mesto pod solntsem [A place under the sun]. URL: http://www.contincnt.kz/2007/03/12.htm. (07.04.2010).

Larin A. G. Chinese migrants in Russia. Istoriya i sovremennost ' [History and Modernity], Moscow: Vostochnaya kniga, 2009.

Larin V. L. Pacific Russia in the context of Foreign Policy and International Relations in the Asia-Pacific Region at the beginning of the XXI Century. Vladivostok: Institute of History, Archeology and Ethnography of the Peoples of the Far East, Far Eastern Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2011.

Mavlony D. Nazarbayev's passing statement led activists to the Chinese Consulate URL: http://rus.azattyq.org/content/Kazakh_lands_rent_to_China_/1901588.html (22.01.2010).

Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2011. The Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of the Population of the Republic of Kazakhstan held an extended board meeting dedicated to the results of the Ministry's work in 2010 and tasks for 2011. Astana, http://www.cnbek.gov.kz/nodc/241138. (01.04.2011).

Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2013 (1). Data on the import of foreign labor into the Republic of Kazakhstan in 2008 Archived data and current statistics. 2013(1).

Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2013 (2). Data on the import of foreign labor into the Republic of Kazakhstan for 1999-2011 Archived data and current statistics. 2013(2)

Myskina A. Naked enthusiasm of light industry / / Karavan, 29.08.2008.

Nezavisimaya gazeta.

The low cost of renting land and high yields attract Chinese farmers to Russia. URL: http://www.idk.ru/ncws/34986 (04.07.2009).

page 118
Vladivostok news. 04.05.2007. URL:http://ncws.vl.ru/vlad/2007/04/05/kitajtcy/ (04.05.2007).

NTA-VOLGA REGION. Nizhny Novgorod government intends to attract Chinese people to work in agricultural enterprises of the region URL: http://www.nta-nn.ru/ncws/itcm/?ID=100352 (9.10.2007).

Primorsky Krai: socio-economic indicators. Federal State Statistics Service. Territorial body of the Federal State Statistics Service for Primorsky Krai. Vladivostok, 2009.

China's Policy at the present stage: realities and Prospects I Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Almaty, 2005.

Chinese migration in Central Asia at the beginning of the XXI century // Economic offensive and migration from China on the example of the Republic of Kazakhstan: challenges and opportunities. Lambert Academic Publishing, 2012.

China needs to know more about the world, and the world needs to know more about China (based on the results of a monitoring sociological study on the attitude to Chinese migrants in Kazakhstan in 2007 and 2012) / / Kazakhstan-Spectrum, 2013, No. 3.
Satpasv D. How long does it take to eat a Kazakh cake with Chinese chopsticks? URL: http://forbcs.kz/proccss/ expertise/dolgo_li_syest_kazahskiy_tort_kitayskimi_palochkami (11.09.2013).

Syroszhkin K. L. [China's presence in Central Asia: Interests, Achievements, Problems]. Collection of reports. Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, Moscow: RISI Publ., 2012.

Labor and employment in Russia. 2009: Statistical collection / M.: Rosstat, 2009.

Zhongguo tongji nianjian. 2008 / Zhonghua renmin gunghego guojia tongji ju bian [Chinese Statistical Yearbook 2008 / State Statistical Office of the People's Republic of China]. Beijing, 2008.

Zhongguo tongji nianjian. 2012 / Zhonghua renmin gunghego guojia tongji ju bian [Chinese Statistical Yearbook 2012 / State Statistical Office of the People's Republic of China]. Beijing, 2012.

Population size and migration of the Russian Federation in 2000-2012. Statistical Bulletin I Federal State Statistics Service, Moscow: Rosstat. 2001,...2013.

Ethnodsmographic yearbook of Kazakhstan. Agency for Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Astana, 2013. [ESTAT074324. pdf]. Accessed on 30.04.2014.

Hasakesitan Huaqiao Bao (Kazakhstan Overseas Chinese Newspaper), http://www.xj.xinhuanet.com/2009-04/01/content_16127856.htm (01.04.2010).

Pannier B. Prospect Of Chinese Farmers Brings Controversy To Kazakh Soil. URL: http://www.rferl.org/ content/Prospect Of Chinese Farmers Brings Controversy To Kazakh Soil/1906896.html (22.01.2010).

page 119

Permanent link to this publication: