С. Kiritescu, Istoria razboiului pentru intregirea Romaniu. 1916 - 1919. Editia II-a, volumul III-a.

"Great" Romania is a product of the imperialist war.

Romania received a number of new provinces as a "reward" from the Entente, despite the fact that it entered the war only in 1916, and already in May 1918 concluded a separate peace with the central powers. In fact, Romania did not fight and could not fight since the collapse of the Romanian front-from October to November 1917.

Having lost almost the entire territory during the war, with the exception of part of Moldavia, Romania after the war received as a" gift " a number of provinces that geographically and in terms of population surpassed "old" Romania: while the population of "old" Romania was 7,897 thousand people, the population of the new provinces is 9,256 thousand people.

Romania managed to capture all these provinces only with the help of the Allies. She received them as a reward for her active struggle against the revolutionary movement both in Russia and especially in Hungary.

Romanian historians have written countless pages about the "great conquests of the Romanian army," including Romania's role in strangling the Hungarian Soviet republic.

Constantin Chiricescu, in his comprehensive work on the "History of the war for the Enlargement of Romania in 1916-1919", pays much attention to the so - called "Romanian-Hungarian war", in which, according to Chiricescu, Romania was destined to fight not only for its national, but also for European interests.

"The war ended for all the peoples," complains Chiricescu, " only the Romanian army had to work with its blood and examples of the greatest heroism to unite all the Romanian brothers into one state. This is a long-desired moment for Bessarabia-it has joined its mother Romania." The Romanian "brothers"from Transylvania were also looking forward to the events of Greater Romania." "It was necessary to seize the moment. The chaos that prevailed in Bolshevik Hungary forced the Romanian government to take the most urgent measures to occupy Transylvania and thereby save the Romanian brothers living in Transylvania from the corrupting INFLUENCE of Hungarian Bolshevism."

"On November 10, the Romanian King Ferdinand I issued an order for a new mobilization to cross the Carpathians. On December 24, Romanian troops entered Cluj, greeted with enthusiasm by the Romanian population of the surrounding areas."

Chiricescu admits that the local Hungarian population was not happy with the arrival of Romanians. He cites this fact. 800 gold mine workers from Baia-Mare, armed with rifles and hand Grenades, attacked the Romanian units (p. 393), and then General Vertelo (Entente representative) allowed the Romanian command to occupy the Sighot - Baia-Mare-Zolan area.

At the same time, Kiritsescu has the "courage" to underestimate that in general, the routines did not shed the blood of the civilian population in vain, and the Hungarians killed and mocked the Romanians.

As you know, the" peacefulness " of the Romanian boyars in Transylvania, Bukovina and Bessarabia was shown by the AXIS in general to the "same extent": murders, the use of medieval tortures-these are the well-known methods of the" peace-loving " policy of the Romanian occupiers.

The regulatory center of political and military life, Kiritsescu goes on to write, was Paris, where the military council, chaired by Gen. Fosha.

The Romanian delegation, headed by Bratianu, made every effort to obtain permission to occupy all of Transylvania, which was promised to Romania under the treaty of 1916 (conditions for declaring war on Romania, Austria-Hungary and Germany), in order to save the population from the" atrocities " of the Hungarians (p. 401).

The main obstacle preventing Transylvanians from joining Romania was the temporary armistice agreement concluded by Gen. Franchet d'esdere in Belgrade with Karol (head of the Hungarian government, - L. K.), according to which the French general allowed the Hungarians to maintain civilian power in the territory promised by the allies to Romania. Undeterred by the treaty, the military council on February 28 allowed the Romanians to move the demarcation line to the west and invited the Hungarians to withdraw their troops within ten days. On March 19, Colonel Vux (a Frenchman) informed Karolyi of the decision of the International military council in Paris. Then Karolyi, according to Izvestia, addressed an appeal to the Hungarian people, pointing out that they were not able to accept these conditions, so humiliating for Hungary; later events took place in Hungary that led to the creation of Soviet power there (March 21, 1919).:

"The revolutionary government was formed under the nominal presidency of Garbai, but the actual dictator was the adventurer, the Jew Bela Kun, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, "writes Chiricescu, who further points out that the new regime in Hungary was"a regime of terror and destruction." "The scum of society has risen to the level of the country's leaders. Bolshevism had become a threat to Europe, and it was mainly directly Bolshevism that threatened Greater Rumania, located between the two Bolshevik countries. The French press has always written about the difficult situation that has been created for Romania."

Shortly after the Hungarian Revolution, the Romanian delegation in Paris again addressed the Council of Great Powers, pointing out that the active actions of the Romanian army in Transylvania were of common European interest under the circumstances. Therefore, the delegation asked the Allies not only for permission for the offensive operations of the Romanian army, but also for material and moral support in strangling the Hungarian revolution.

In order to emphasize the" heroism "and" determination "of the Romanian generals, and forgetting that he himself had said two pages earlier that" the Allies have decided to act, " Chiricescu does everything possible to obscure the role of the Entente, and especially France, in organizing the Romanian campaign in Hungary: "The High Council," he writes, " did nothing to help and decided to send the gene. Smuts, in order to negotiate with the Bel Kun government." The Romanian government seemed to have to act independently, at its own risk. It is well known, however, that the Entente imperialists immediately decided to use the Rumanian and Czechoslovak armies to overthrow the Soviet government of Hungary.

"On April 16, 1919," Kiritsescu continues, " an offensive against Hungary was ordered (pp. 407-408). General Myrdyrescu led the fighting. It was necessary to get the promised territory and protect the unfortunate population from looting and violence ."

"The offensive of the Romanian army lasted 15 (fifteen) days. The Romanian sabre in two weeks unraveled what European diplomacy had been entangling for months. The Romanian army was stationed at the Tissa. But the Romanian victorious army could not be satisfied with fulfilling its national duty. Full satisfaction could come with the protection of common European interests" (my detente - L. K.).

The image of the Romanian army as the "defender" of "pan-European" interests does not seem to require any comments. "The Rumanian army," Kiritsescu goes on to write, " was faced with the question of ridding central Europe of the Bolshevik danger. It was easy for the victorious Romanian army to capture Budapest. But the military council in Paris categorically forbade crossing the Tissot.

Further offensive of the Romanians unfolded in connection with the struggle of the Hungarian revolutionary army with the Czechoslovaks:

"Based on comradely feelings (my detente - L. K.)," Kiritsescu declares, " the Romanian commander launched an offensive."

The weak forces of the Czechoslovak army were forced to retreat and thus lost contact with the Romanian army; only thanks to the successful operations of the VIII Romanian Division was communication established at Maramuresh between the Romanian and Polish armies, and thus the connection of the Hungarian revolutionary army with the red detachments of Ukraine was prevented.

Speaking about the offensive actions of the Romanian army, Chiricescu admires the" audacity " of the Romanian representative Bratianu, who refused to agree to the withdrawal of Romanian troops from Tissa. Chiricescu is doing his best to prove that Romania pursued an independent policy and acted contrary to the demands of the great Powers.

Further developments, he points out, showed that the Romanian government was right. The communist danger was growing: in Vienna, the Communists made an attempt to seize power, and this forced the Paris Council to act more decisively.

On July 11, a meeting was held at which Marshal Foch insisted that seven Rumanian, two French, two Czechoslovak and one Serbian divisions should be sent against Bolshevik Hungary to capture Budapest. "The Roumanian army, having received reinforcements, on July 29-30, crossed the Tissa and very soon took Budapest, and thus Hungarian Bolshevism, the vanguard of the Russian revolution, which had threatened the peace of Europe for four months, was forced to retreat before the Roumanian force."

Chiricescu goes on to describe the joy with which the Romanian troops entered Budapest: "Budapest, conquered by the great heroic Romanian army, we won in a just struggle" (p.488). Chiricescu gives a list of the" benefactions " of the Romanian army in Budapest and throughout Hungary. He writes that the Rumanian command organized special dinners for the Hungarian poor, that "the Rumanian army protected the Jews from pogroms, because the population was embittered against the Jews, among whom there were many communists "(pp. 491-498, my detente-L. K.), that the Rumanian officers - these well-known organizers of Jewish pogroms "defending the Jews!

The fact that the new Hungarian government complained to the Entente about looting and requisitioning carried out by the valiant Romanian army, Kiritsescu himself is forced to tell his readers: the new Hungarian government thought, says Kiritsescu, "to spoil our reputation in the eyes of the allies, but the allies did not forget that Rumania defended the peace of Europe with the blood of her soldiers" (p. 499).

The Hungarian Soviet Republic fell, of course, not because its Red Army could not resist the power of the"great Romanian army". Despite extremely difficult conditions, the Hungarian Red Army won a number of victories over both Czechoslovak and Romanian troops. The Hungarian Soviet Republic fell for a number of reasons, the most important of which was undoubtedly the grossly erroneous tactics of the Communists in relation to social democracy. Having united with the latter, the Hungarian Communist Party, as is well known, could not decisively suppress the internal counter-revolution, could not carry out Lenin's instruction: "Be firm. If there is any hesitation among the socialists who joined you yesterday, the dictatorship of the proletariat, or

among the petty bourgeoisie, suppress the fluctuations mercilessly. Execution is the legitimate fate of a coward in war. " ¹

The difficult internal conditions were compounded by the difficult international situation and the difficulties of fighting the counter-revolution on the external front. The Social Democrats who were in power in Czechoslovakia and Austria also tried to strangle small Soviet Hungary. This was ultimately what enabled the Rumanian boyars and capitalists to complete the military defeat of Soviet Hungary prepared by social-democracy from within and from without.

Modern bourgeois Rumania is feverishly preparing for a future war organized by the imperialists, to play the role of one of the stranglers of the Soviet Union. It is not surprising, therefore, that its historians, like Kiritsescu, are doing their best to spread the legend among the masses about the "valiant role" that the Rumanian army played in suppressing the Hungarian proletarian revolution.

¹ Lenin, Soch., vol. XV, p. 229

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