The experience of strategic partnership with the u. s. a.: comparison and results for Ukraine

By Volodymyr CHUMAK

Department Head, National Institute for Strategic Studies

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From the very beginning of the history of the newest independence of Ukrainian state development of relations with the United States America is the priority in our foreign policy. The principal document Primary Directions of External Policy of Ukraine, passed by the Verkhovna Rada on July 2, 1993, reads, that "Ukraine pays special attention to its relations with the United States of America as a country, the policy of which excercises substantial influence on the development of international events." The foreign-policy practice testifies, that Ukrainian diplomacy in the American direction constantly followed this directive.

Consequently, during the state visit of Leonid Kuchma, President of Ukraine, to the United States of America in November 1994, the leaders of both states signed the Charter of Ukrainian-American Partnership, Friendship and Cooperation, inaugurating the new way to the full-scale intergovernmental cooperation in political, economic, scientific and technical, humanitarian and other branches. This event can be considered the beginning of the qualitatively new stage in Ukrainian-American relations: already in September 1996, during the working visit of the Secreatary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine to the U. S. A. the parties established the fact of upgrading of the Ukrainian-American relations to the level of strategic partnership. This establishment was confirmed by the announcement about creation of the Ukrainian-American intergovernmental commission headed by President of Ukraine L. Kuchma and US Vice President A. Gore ( "Kuchma-Gore Commission").

Early in June 2000 US President Bill Clinton paid an official visit to Ukraine, which demonstrated strengthening of relations of strategic partnership between Ukraine and the U. S. A.: the presidents

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signed the Joint Statement, which in essence obligated the sides to deepen these relations.

During the aforesaid period the solid juridically-legal base of Ukrainian-American relations was created; it includes one hundred and more documents of different level (interstate, intergovernmental, interdepartmental) and contents (economy, trade, power, ecology, culture, science and technologies, transport, security, military, etc.).

Regretfully, in 2002 not only the dynamics of these relations was lost, but they were put to the strenuous test, especially during the so called "kolchuha affair". However, both parties did not waste time and understood the necessity of the quickest possible enabling of the situation; towards the end of the year they started looking for the way out of the impass.

From this point onwards, one of the main priorities of Ukrainian foreign policy envisaged correction of negative tendencies in the Ukrainian-American relations and bringing them on the level of conventional strategic partnership. In his Appeal to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in connection with the Message of the President of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine About Internal and External Position of Ukraine in 2002" the head of the state underlines the special importance of the "renewal of constructive dialog with the United States of America intended to maintain principles of strategic partnership, development of relations on the basis of mutual respect, non-interference into internal political processes, removal of barriers on the way to bilateral trade and investments."

The U. S. A., as this ensues from the official documents, aim at establishing close partnership with the countries sharing the like basic values and strategic interests. The Strategy of the National Security of the United States of America reads, that "America will realize its strategy on the strength of formation of coalitions-being so expanded, as they need to be-of states, that can and desire to contribute to the balance of forces in favor of freedom. " ¹

Thus, the Ukrainian party continuously craves for strategic partnership, in response to which the American side, at least, does not turn down the possibility of close interaction.

Let us note among other things, that the analysis of the majority of American official documents of strategic level allows to presume, that-unlike the domestic tradition-the "strategic partnership", evidently, is not identified with the highest form of intergovermental interaction and mutual liabilities. More widespread are such definitions as "allies and friends", which concretely determine the level of interstate relations ² . So the task, set by Ukraine, concerning the principles of strategic partnership in relations with the U. S. A., should be considered the primary one. In this respect there is a valuable experience of other states, which have travelled their way to the circle of "allies and friends" of America, and also advantages and disadvantages of the said status.

The pilot analysis allowed to reduce the group under review to four countries representing the aforesaid circle, which are situated in different zones of geopolitical concern of the U. S. A. and

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which had substantially different foundations for the development of strategic interaction. The benchmark of this analysis was selected as determination of five priorities of American domestic and security policy as seen by President George Bush during his past presidential campaign:

* creation of formations of allies for the settlement of tasks associated with other world powers;

* nuclear threat;

* question of Western hemisphere;

* trade relations; and

* Near-East problem in connection with the security of Israel.

According to these directives, the Administration pays special attention to strengthening of integration, primarily in Asiatic-Pacific region. The main part in this integration should be played by Japan, aloowing, firstly, for the rapidly increasing strength of China, and, secondly, for the threatening nuclear ambitions of North Korea.

Japan

In 1951 the core idea of the allience of the U. S. A. and Japan wa the U. S. endeavor to control the undesirable regional outcome of Korean War ³ . Ever since, according to experts, the American-Japanese cooperation in the field of security has been closely connected with the problem of two Koreas. Due to the existence of bilateral defense alliances (U. S. A. -Japan and U. S. A. -Republic of Korea) all these three countries are allies de facto. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is the principal source of threat for them. The North Korean threat (real or fictitious) increased in the early 90s on the strength of appearance of the nuclear problem. There appeared additional trouble at the turn of the century when North Korean missiles could potentially hit targets in Japan and even the U. S. A. ⁴

In 1960 the new Japan-U. S. Mutual Security Treaty was drawn providing for consolidation of American military contingents on the Japanese Islands and establishing of their double purpose. Consequently, article VI of the Treaty determines "rendering assistance to Japan in security matters and maintaining peace and security in the Far East".

The joint American-Japanese Declaration of Security of April 17, 1996 confirms, that this defense union will remain actual in 21st c.

In September 1997 military administrations of both countries adopted the new Compiled Directives On The Defense Interaction replacing that of 1978. According to these documents American military have guaranteed more extensive access to the use of Japanese infrastructure in the time of crisis. They also acknowledge the possibility of limited engagement of Japanese self-defence forces "depending on situations evolving in the zones neighboring Japan", including mine clearing, search-and-rescue system and reconnaissance. ⁵

Current American-Japanese relations encompass a wide variety of strategic problems, among which there are foreign policy of the U. S. A., economic cooperation, trade, finances, anti-missile defense, and regional security. The problems of the latter include the threat of nuclear

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and rocket proliferation by North Korea, prospects of turning China into factor of regional force control, American military presence on Japanese islands. Because Japan is rather afraid of North Korean missile threat and increasing might of China, Tokio exerts itself to strengthen self-defense in addition to increasing co-operation with the United States, as this was foreseen by the said Directives on defense interaction. From 1999 Japan also takes part in the research and development in the framework of antimissile defense project, although it still hesitates about the future purchasing and deployment of the system ⁶ .

The Bush Administration gave new impetus to Japanese-American co-operation in the field of security: Japan is closely monitored by American politicians in Asia. In his speech on the occasion of appointment of new Ambassador of the U. S. A. Sen. Howard H. Baker, Jr., American President was very precise: "We send the best representatives to Japan, because the United States has no more important partner in the world, than Japan" ⁷ .

No doubt, American leader was right: relations with Japan are of particular importance for American national interests. Today the U. S. A. and Japan have the most advanced economies in the world responsible for 40% of global GDP. Therefore their mutual relations are not only of bilateral importance, but of global importance as well. Japan occupies the third place (after Canada and Mexico) among importers of American goods and second among exporters to the U. S. A. market. This country is also the major consumer of American services and occupies the second place as service supplier to the United States. If we consider the volume of overseas direct investments into economy, Japan is the second country and the fifth major recipient of direct American investments abroad; at the same time for these indexes America for Japan is the major investor, and recipient of Japanese capital ⁸ .

The end of Cold War and disappearance of the USSR cast doubt on some strategic principles of American-Japanese defense alliance: however, both states go on thinking, that further existence, even strengthening of the alliance is in their best interest.

Consequently, this alliance and American nuclear umbrella give Japan a manoeuvre possibility in its relations with more powerful militant neighbors. At the same time, thanks to allied obligations and bases on Japanese islands, the U. S. A. has a possibility of reliable backing its logistics during military operations in Pacific and Persian Gulf; it is a question of rapid deployment of marine corps and and logistics for U. S. Navy and U. S. Air Force. Moreover, the geostrategic situation of Okinawa gives important advantage to American global military obligations; therefore 75% and more of service support and 29,000 out of 47,000-strong U. S. A. contingent are deployed on Okinawa ⁹ .

It was on Okinawa in September 1995 that the great hue and cry was raised against American presence on the island. The rally was triggered by a grave incident when American servicemen raped a Japanese schoolgirl. In September 1966, a year after these events, the Okinawa residents' referendum backed up the resolution calling to cut down the American military presence on the island. In

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their reply the governments of the U. S. A. and Japan drew an agreement, according to which the American military were to free 21% of bases occupied by them and island territories during seven-year period.

The tangle over American bases began to burn properly in 2001 on the strength of new accusations against several servicemen of sexual abuse and arson: in February the Assembly of Okinawa Prefecture passed a resolution calling for the reduction of American military force on the island.

The top Japanese administrators dropped a hint, that the state would insist upon changing the implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement, SOFA, so that the arrest right of American servicemen and members of their families implicated in crimes on the territory of Japan would be transferred to the Japanese authorities. However, the White house and Pentagon object against any SOFA changes and refuse to negotiate any Japanese proposals concerning concrete terms of presence of the American military contingents on Okinawa.

However, trade and economic problems much more frequently become a bone of contention in American-Japanese interstate relations. The long-standing deficit in the U. S. trade relations with Japan is is a constant source of discord. It peaked in 2000 exceeding $81bn. only to fall away in the years to come because of economic problems in both countries.

In the recent years the U. S. Congress criticized Japan for its steel dumping; the former introduced special legislative norms intended to back American firms suffering losses. A year ago, in March, American government introduced additional "protection" tariffs on some steel grades importable from Japan and other countries ¹⁰ .

Republic of Korea

The American-South Korean partnership is rather unique: Republic of Korea (Republic of Korea) was the first country, where the U. S. A. -led coalition forces participated in direct military conflict with the ideological enemy during the Cold War. 33,000 American servicemen were killed and 101,000 wounded during the Korean War in 1950 to 1953.

Nevertheless, the Korean Peninsula-for the presence of unbeknown, and hence incomprehensible and enigmatic world pariah Democratic People's Republic of Korea-remains one of the main sources of dangerous conflict today. Concerns are growing because of the nuclear ambitions of Pyongyang, its missile program combined with economic calamity, which have impact on electric power and food shortages.

Against this background South Korea is seen as a major stabilizer in the region. Therefore, it's only natural, that the U. S. A. links the strategic importance of Republic of Korea with the problem of North Korea and its most threatening aspects-nuclear and missile programs of this country. But the contemporary American-Korean partnership goes beyond the security and political aspects: economical segment is no less important.

The U. S. A. agreed to defend South Korea from external aggression under the Mutual Defense Treaty, 1954. 37,000 American servicemen, supporting

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650,000 strong South Korean army, are deployed on the territory of Republic of Korea today. These forces are intended to contain 1.2m military force of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea deployed in immediate vicinity of the demilitarized zone separating Republic of Korea from Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The U. S. A. aid to Seoul reached USD9bn in 1945 to 2002.

In Washington they have been long considering the political stability of Republic of Korea an essential element for economic development of the country, maintaining security balance on the peninsula and promoting peace in North-Eastern Asia. At the same time, the official representatives of all American administrations put pressure upon South Korean government making it to gradually liberalize political process and grant political freedom in the country.

American economic aid to South Korea during 1945-2002 exceeded USD6bn. It went went dowwn in the mid 70s, when Republic of Korea reached high indexes of economic development. Today the U. S. A. is the second major trade partner of Republic of Korea, being inferior to China only last year, and the most favorable market for Korean export.

As regards the U. S. A., within a deade South Korea turned into one of the leading trade partners: it is seventh on the list being ahead of such West European countries as France and Italy. The South Korean market is the sixth most important for the U. S. export. The U. S. A. is the leading foreign investor for Republic of Korea: during the last three years American companies invested about USD10bn into the republic's economy ¹¹ .

Besides the immediate strategic interest to South Korea as situation stabilizer on Korean Peninsula and American bridgehead in North-Eastern Asia this country plays its role in the U. S. Chinese strategy. There are reasons to believe that good relations between the U. S. A. and Chinese People's Republic are a prerequisite of final reconciliation on Korean Peninsula. For example, following the initiative of President Reigan, Beijing was invited to negotiations on peaceful settlement between South and North ¹² . However, it is likely, that in this complicated play Seoul feels ill at ease: allowing for the strengthening of economic relations between the Chinese People's Republic and Republic of Korea, the negative results of possible straining relations between the U. S. A. and Chinese People's Republic cause alarm.

That is why for South Korea it is a major task to escape being caught between a rock and a hard place-between Beijing and Washington-and improving political, economic relations and strategic interaction with the Chinese People's Republic in directions, which will contribute to gradual process of reunification of Korea. (One couldn't but remember problems of Ukraine with Russian Federation!)

In this respect the experts point at the powerful spirit of reviving Korean nationalism which kept being eroded during forty years of Japanese colonialism and fifty years of partition of the nation and which is gradually renovating now and becoming a new, or even decisive element under current situation. This factor can make a unified country under any political ruling considerably less susceptible to

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foreign manipulations, which might be to the disadvantage both of the U. S. A., and Chinese People's Republic ¹³ .

The latter may be illustrated by the changes in popular reception of American military presence in South Korea, which were noticed as early as in 1998 fear of the military threat from North Korea had subsided.

In 2000 both mass media and public of Republic of Korea passed strictures on domestic government which was working to choose a new generation fighter for the Korean Air Force and was showing preference for the U. S. F15K that competed with European models. This criticism was triggered by reports and evidence that the choice was done under pressure on the part of American administration.

In accordance with the Gallup poll, the population of Republic Korea shows less interest to the threat from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Nevertheless, Americans think that this threat increases, because without reduction of one-million- strong military froce North Korea goes on with its program of nuclear weapons and missile tests. Critics of American position concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea indicate that serviceability of conventional weapons in this country kept deteriorating since the 90s, which had its objective causes, and that physical and educational condition are rather poor because of the acute food problem.

The South Koreans are becoming ever more irritable on the issue of American military in their country, which is considered a shortcoming now and not a guarantee of better future relations between South and North ¹⁴ .

Anti-American feelings in the Republic of Korea culminated last year, when two local schoolgirls were killed under wheels of American military vehicle. The South Korean administration demanded to institute criminal proceedings against American servicemen driving the vehicle according to domestic legislation. Nevertheless American military administration refused referring to the paragraphs of the Korean- American Status of the Forces Agreement, according to which the American servicemen accused of criminal behavior in the course of duty should be under the U. S. military jurisdiction. In the end the American court martial brought in a verdict of not guilty for the accused servicemen. In retaliation for this acquittal public disorders flooded South Korea; some American servicemen were assaulted; there were cases when Americans were denied consumer services. The anti-Americanism was used even by the acting president of South Korea during his election campaign, because it was to the purpose of Korean society.

In March 2002 American and South Korean governments declared the ten-year plan to halve American contingent, stationed in the Republic of Korea. This past June the U. S. A. and Republic of Korea reached the settlement on redeployment of 15,000 of American military southward, as far as possible from the demilitarized zone of the country.

There are also misunderstandings in the otherwise happy sphere of bilateral economic cooperation. They bear upon the trade policy. The sticking point here is the big trade deficit of the U. S. A., state of American economy, progress of Korean

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economic reforms and dependence of the bilateral trade conditions on political and security reasonings.

During the Korean financial crisis of 1997-1998, the Clinton administration attempted to soften Seoul criticism of the quasi obstructions created by the U. S. A. to foreign exporters and investors. From the early 2000 the discontent with the state of bilateral trade relations was smoldering in the U. S. A. These transformations in American policy were triggered mostly by fluctuations of American-Korean trade balance, which began changing to the detriment of the U. S. A. Recently the adverse effect of the hard line of Washington in its relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has become evident; the latter goes with the deadlock in relations with two Koreas ¹⁵ .

The discontent of Washington with its ally is supplemented with traditional problems with democracy in South Korea, which bring on more and more overt criticism on the part of the U. S. A. .

MEXICO

The United States is geographically situated in the Western hemisphere; hence, it should naturally look after security, stability and economic development of this region. The Strategy of National Security for the New Age reads: "The economic growth and integration on American continent will deeply influence the prosperity of the United States in the 21st century. First of all it concerns our immediate neighbors, Canada and Mexico" ¹⁶ .

The American-Mexican partnership is focused on three branches of cooperation vitally important for the U. S. A.: economy and trade, boundary problem and drugs control.

Three North American neighbor countries initiated special relations among them: the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), pact that calls for the gradual removal of tariffs and other trade barriers on most goods produced and sold in North America. NAFTA became effective in Canada, Mexico, and the United States on January 1, 1994.

In 1999 this Agreement permitted Mexico to outrun Japan and become the second most important trade partner of the U. S. A. after Canada. If in 1993 commodity turnover of both countries made USD81.5bn, in 2001 it already reached almost USD233bn. Today Mexico is one of the leading Latin American targets for heavy U. S. investments which only in 2001 totalled about $35bn.

For Mexico the U. S. A. is the most important exporter, which consumes about 87% of the country's export, specifically petroleum, automobiles and their accessories, and agricultural production. At the same time the American part in Mexican import makes 77 percent. The United States account for 60% percent of foreign investments in Mexico; the U. S. A. citizens are the best customers of the Mexican tourist industry.

The steep curve of American-Mexican partnership is rather indicative. In the early 80s the economic system of Mexico was characterized as closed and static, and foreign policy of the country often conflicted with that of the United States. Starting with President Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado, 1982 to 1988, the Mexican administration successively and persistently realized complex economic,

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reforms of domestic and foreign policy.

As a result this country's economy was opened for trade investments, new electoral laws were passed, equal business transaction regulations established, cooperation initiated with the U. S. A. in such sensible fields, as drug control, border problems and illegal migration. Step-by-step their cooperation in the framework of NAFTA becomes deeper, and both countries agreed on annual meetings of the bilateral commission.

The belated border problem and illegal migration between two countries are the major issues now. On account of economic, political, ethnic, historic and other causes the former has no simple solution, and tragic events of 9/11 in the U. S. A. aggravated it even more.

The scope of this problem is very big; according to the estimations of such agency as the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the United States, late in 1996 there lived about three million illegal immigrants from Mexico that is more than one half of all illegal population in the U. S. A.; however, the preliminary data for 2000 are considerably higher ¹⁷ .

Meanwhile, the Mexican party maintains, that these migrants are not illegal immigrants, only "workers without documents". They think, that if American market needs migrants and provides jobs for them, the U. S. A. is to partially blame for this situation as well. Therefore the American party should be aware of the negative aspect of stricter border regulations increasing the number of perished and wounded illegal Mexican migrants which can but choose more risky routes and means to penetrate into the U. S. territory.

The Mexican profit from illegal migration consists in the fact that the country treats it as an original "safety valve" to let out superfluous political steam, pressure of which can dangerously rise because of rising unemployment in Mexico. Also, these workers are good earners sending money home to their families, that remain in Mexico. According to different estimations this sum varies from USD1bn to USD10bn annually ¹⁸ .

However, from 1996 the U. S. A. carried out the general immigration reform, that increased boundary protection and control. Simulteneously, the boundary security questions became the object of regular bilateral consultations with the Mexican party. Early in 2001 American and Mexican presidents reached an agreement on initiation of the summit talks intended to maintain secure, legal and well-ordered migratory flows between their countries, and some of such negotiations have already taken place.

There is the objective set in the already mentioned American Strategy of The National Security for the New Age: by 2007 the U. S. A. together with its allies must halve drugs traffic and peddling in the country ¹⁹ . According to American officials, Mexico remains the main trafficker of such drugs, as heroin, metamphetamine, marijuana, and maintainer of transit traffic of cocaine, one half of which is illicitly sold in the United States afterwards.

During Mexican-American Summit, 2001, the leaders agreed to boost their efforts in the field of legislative support of drugs control. At the same time, the Mexican party spent no efforts to find and neutralize drug barons and corrupted

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narcs in the elite federal drug squads.

For a long time the U. S. A. blamed Mexican authorities for multiple human rights violations, including tortures, constraints, persecution of journalists and human rights watch men, killing and "disappearance" of oppositional politicians, etc. But from mid 90s Mexico tried its hardest to improve this situation starting from backing the activity of the National commission for human rights, reforming principles of law, personnel training. It is significant, that immediately after his inauguration the Presrent of Mexico signed the agreement with the UNO about rendering technical help by this organization in the field of human rights in the first place.

At the same time Mexico City sticks up for its citizens more actively, often straining relations with its strategic partner. Last year the Mexican president even canceled his planned visit to Texas and meeting with his American counterpart protesting against the death sentence pronounced by state authorities for the murder of Mexican policeman, which was denied turning to officials of his country for consular aid. Early this year Mexico, on behalf of 54 Mexican citizens, condemned to execution in the U. S. A., brought an action to the internation tribunal against the United States of America. In it the American officials were accused of violation of Viennese convention on consular relations on the strength of systematic denying Mexicans their right to be informed about their right to consular aid, foreseen by this document.

Recently it has become evident, that Mexican government does not limit itself with strengthening partnership with the United States, despite all its importance, but craves for activization and diversification of external policy of the country, including wider participation of Mexico in the UNO undertakings and expansion of its relations with countries of Latin America and Europe. For example, it supports the development of cooperation relations among Central American economies and southeast states of Mexico named Puebla-Panama Plan. The Group-of-Three initiative, including Columbia, Venezuela and Mexico, is being reanimated to improve relations with the regional Common Market of the South (Mercosur); Mexico is working to expand trade with the European Union according to the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and Mexico in force since 2000.

Israel

The American-Israeli relations are an important factor of American policy in the Near East. These relations gradually developed from the prompt backing by America of the new Jewish state in 1948-literally minutes after proclamation by it of independence on May 14-to the unique strategic partnership between the small, but militarily powerful Near East country and global superpower, that strives to balance the conflicting interests in the region.

There is one important peculiarity: the United States policy of aiding Israel has wide support not only of American Jews and considerable part of Christian community in the U. S. A., but it also profits from the common feeling that the state there is a modern democratic society,

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founded on strong liberal and humanitarian principles, "pioneer" and foremost country, defender of exiles, encircled by the enemy and bellicose Arab neighbors ²⁰ .

In the first post-war years the American aid to Israel was spent to settle the life of a great many Jewish refugees, displaced persons and victims of Holocaust committed by German nazis.

With the development of the Cold War the Near East rapidly turned into one of the priority zones of geopolitical rivalry between the U. S. A. and FSU. America tended to cut soviet influence there, guaranteeing access for the developed economies to regional oil fields, step-up democracy and market economy implementation, develop relations and trade among the Near Eastern countries. Accordingly, role of Israel increased, because its strategic situation improved national security of the country (first of all, bringing up its own military strength) and helped to reach the aforesaid goals.

The end of Cold War and disappearance of probable soviet threat in the region could but bring up the question of purpose and content of strategic partnership between Israel and the United States in the absence of geopolitical confrontation. However, the next Near East crisis in August 1990 provoked by Iraqi invasion of Kuwait exacerbated general situation in the Near East. Finally, the powerful explosion of terrorism with Arabic roots had dramatic impact on America itself, and, evidently, provided new impetus to its allied partnership with Israel.

However, it needs mentioning, that officially Israel did not become an "ally" or "strategic partner" of the United States of America at once; there was no rush and the process evolved gradually.

The FSU opposition to Israel was considered by administration of President R. Reagan as the strategic gain of the U. S. A. . In November 1981 Secretaries of defense of Israel and U. S. A. Ariel Sharon and Caspar Weinberger signed Memorandum of understanding; that is how the format was created for current consultations and partners cooperation intended to strengthen their national security and jointly stand against the soviet threat. Although in a month, in December same year, the State Department suspended the Memorandum in response to Israel's annexation of Syrian Golan Heights ²¹ .

In November 1983 the parties renewed their dialogue on bilateral strategic cooperation and formed the joint military-political committee, which was intended to implement the provisions of the mentioned Memorandum.

In June 1984 the joint air and naval military manoeuvres were organized; at the same time the U. S. A. began creating the infrastructure to stockpile military equipment on tthe territory of Israel.

However, in 1985 American-Israeli relations again were put on trial as a result of two espionage cases. American citizen Richard Smyth was accused of illegal export to Israel of 800 high-speed electronic toggle buttons which could be used for nuclear arms detonators. At the same time U. S. Navy secret service man Jonathan Pollard and his wife were accused of passing classified documents to Israel ²² .

In May 1986 the confidential agreement was signed, which dealt with Israel's participation in anti-missile defense research and development. Within

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the framework of this project the U. S. A. helped Israel to work on the national anti- missile defense system Arrow. .

In March 1988 the parties adopted the five-year agreement intended to create legal rationale for joint projects in military, political, economic and reconnaissance branches. On the grounds of this agreement Israel was acknowledged as the "main ally of the U. S. A. outside the North-Atlantic Alliance."

Despite this acknowledgement there are no legally binding liabilities concerning joint defense from the assault, as is the case with alliances. However, Israelis obtained preferential treatment drawing contracts with the U. S. Department of Defense and reduced rates to purchase American defense technology.

But the main index of importance of that or other state for the U. S. A. and level of relations with it is the volume of American help; and here Israel, despite its small dimensions, is unrivalled beyond doubt. From 1976 on it is the major receiver of American aid; from 1985 this state obtains yearly about USD3bn for the support of defense, economic, humanitarian and other branches. At the outset of 2003 fiscal year the U. S. A. aid to to Israel exceeded USD87bn., including grants-about USD72bn. and borrowings-USD15bn ²³ .

Moreover, the United States aid to Israel has some peculiarities, such as borrowing with the delay of payments or economic funding liabilities that equal Israel's past arrears. Israel also receives some exclusive preferences, such as American help in R&D in the field of defense on the territory of the U. S. A., assistance in national export of weaponry, or the possibility to get the lump sum of aid during the first month of a new fiscal year, and not in three to four tranches, as in the case of other recipients.

However, it is worth noting, that despite the existing foreign-policy coordination concerning Israel, there is a diversity of opinions about the level of aid to Israel and general liabilities among American experts and political establishment. The opponents of extra favors to Tel Aviv opine, that American interests in the Near East are considerably wider and that focusing on Israel impedes the development of mutually beneficial relations with numerous countries of Arabic world.

This discord is reflected in the cyclic attempts of the U. S. A. to balance their liabilities to Israel by other regional bonds and projects. There is a vivid example of American arms delivery to the Near East countries with a view of strengthening their defense in the case of possible aggression. In Israel these supplies wer treated only as a threat to its national security.

Today the aforesaid situation is the same. According to American press, this past April 4 President George Bush introduced the all-embracing strategy of the Near East crisis. It makes three key assumptions. Firstly, the Israel's own strategy will never be able to bring about results, which would permit this state to have good reasons to hope for peaceful and safe existence. Secondly, Israel and Palestine will never be able to tackle the conflict on their own. Thirdly, the vital American interests are at stake there, which wouldn't be limited to its liabilities to Israel and participation in the Near East

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peaceful process demanding active and prolonged American involvement ²⁴ .

There is one more distinction, which faultlessly points to the importance for the U. S. A. of its partnership with Israel: the unprecedented tolerance of Washington toward the strategic planning of Tel Aviv, which feels free to interpret its liabilities to its ally, and numerous facts of its violation.

There is a significant fact that Americans never comment about the common world community conviction that Israel is a de facto nuclear state. And in the meantime the United States maintains that the control of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is the first priority of American external policy; moreover, there is a standing conflict in the Near East ²⁵ . One cannot overestimate the importance of such phenomenon in the absence of real cooperation between these two countries.

There is more evidence to that process.

The American aid to Israel is conditioned by the prohibition to use the allotted funds on occupied territories. In this connection there were continuous suppositions from the American side, that Tel Aviv all the same utilized these funds to regulate Israeli settlements on occupied territories. Anyway, the experts say, that they know only one case, which happened in 1953, when the United States delayed rendering aid to Israel, untill it stopped realization of the drainage project along the boundary between Israel and Syria in the demilitarized zone of UNO ²⁶ .

The defense industry program stipulates limitations of aid as well: Israel should use armaments and defense technology only for matters of internal security and country defense; Israel cannot transfer American weapons to the third states without the expressed consent of the U. S. A.

There were many accounts about possible violations by Israel of these limitations. The most recent facts include the reports in winter 2001 and summer 2002, when the U. S. A. government and congressmen investigated the cases when Israel used American military equipment-specifically, helicopters Apache and Cobra, F-16 fighter-bombers-not as they should be, but to inflict strikes on the infrastructure of Palestinians ²⁷ .

Some observations

Taking into account the priority of Ukrainian aspect in this article declared in the subhead, we consciously omit the issue of the United States partnership with the countries-members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, with which they are connected by allied bonds: for a considerable perod of time Ukraine will remain outside NATO and it will have to structure its strategic partnership with the U. S. A. on a bilateral foundation.

That is why we will take interest in bilateral partnership in the first place, especially such partnership, which provides a possibility to see a variety of possible forms and practical applications of this phenomenon. Of course, taking into account the limitations of the size of publication, we will not proceed with the detailed analysis of the above examples; we will only show their most important and vivid aspects.

However, they permit to catch

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sight of the main or general pattern, which is typical of all close partnerships of the U. S. A., without respect to regional specific character or peculiarity of historic conditions. And it deserves special emphasis.

Usually such general patterns of partnership have positive and negative potentials.

The United States establish relations of two-side close partnership only there and then, where and when this is in accord with their vital or important national interests ²⁸ . The European region is no exception: thestability of Europe, where Ukraine belongs, is considered "vitally important" for the security of the U. S. A. ²⁹ . The American strategy determines two goals in this region: (1) creation of really democratic, integrated, well-to-do and peaceful Europe, where integration of Russian Federation, Ukraine and other CIS countries to new Europe and international community is a key priority and (2) cooperation with allies and partners of America on this side of Atlantic to be able to respond to global challenges.

Having taken part in tackling Iraqi crisis and follow-up stabilization of situation in this country, Ukraine demonstrated its readiness and resources to back the U. S. A. in its accepting such challenge. (One could make a supposition, that for global purpose Washington would also welcome the use by Ukraine of its another unique resource- experience of nuclear missile disarmament in the framework of solution of the North Korean problem.)

But really attractive for close partnership Ukraine can become due to the peculiarities of its geographical situation, because economically speaking it is the welcome potential competitor for the western neighbors. Particularly, Ukrainian territory has enormous transit perspectives for the transfer of Caspian energy resources to the world markets, if the U. S. A. goes major shares with realization of this project, as is foreseen by its Strategy of national security ³⁰ .

There is one more concomitant aspect with good prospects of American Ukrainian strategic cooperation-i. e. security, especially if Ukraine manages to become the indisputable leader of the formation, the scope of activity of which will include the security of existing and future regional communications.

The case in point is the GUUAM organization. The increasing interest of the U. S. A. to this project was shown by the high level of Washington's representation on GUUAM summit in Yalta this year. (One can assume that this same circumstance contributed to the growth of interest in the world to this structure: there were guests from 19 countries and 10 international organizations.)

Assertions of some enemies of rapprochement with America about its maleficence, even danger for national interests of a separate country are contrary to fact. By the highest standards, if there was a clear understanding of one's objectives, in all cases the close partnership with the United States was of benefit to the national interests of partner countries: their national security became stronger; the possibilities of regional influence, weight and international political authority augmented; their economic development increased its pace and they received sizeable financial aid intended to boost decisive reforms.

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From experience we know that such partnership is no obstacle for diversification of political and economic cooperation, and-quite the contrary-as the example of Mexico shows, it hastens their development.

However, there is a more important condition of close cooperation with the U. S. A.: the intention of the partner country to develop the westernized democracy at home and guarantees of civil liberties. Moreover, from the very beginning the support of Israel, as an island of democracy, was positioned as one of major arguments for the necessity of aid to this country.

One should understand, that question of democracy is actually a matter of principle for Washington, and one should be ready for continuous monitoring and pressure from the American side if liabilities are not met. Usually, in some instances, for some time the U. S. A. can make use of double standards concerning the problem with democracy in the partner country pursuin its own political goals. But one should not aspire to maintain such policy in the long term.

As the experience of close partners of the U. S. A. shows, both definitions and formalization of partnership not always accord with the level of real closeness of the parties. There is a vivid example of Israel, which enjoys a lot more privileges, than some U. S. A. allies de jure.

Now, is the "strategic partnership" in the interpretation of Washington the kind of mutual relations with the U. S. A. which Ukraine likes to establish? Or, it is only an initial stage on the way to closer relations, "close friendship" and, after all, "alliance"? More than that, one can assume, that, allowing for the geopolitical situation of Ukraine, the disagreement between the declarative forms of relations with the superpower and their real filling can appear useful and widen the field for political maneuver in critical situations.

Even the close partnership in the contemporary open world never remains cloudless and conflict-free. Periodic frictions, tensity in relations, especially in economic ones, is a natural phenomenon under conditions of free society and market relations. In the U. S. A. this phenomenon is treated without satisfaction, but with understanding. One should be ready that such measures on the part of the United States, as anti-dumping investigations, protectionism of own producer, guarantees of preferential conditions for American investors etc. will be used by American side without respect to the level of strategic liabilities.

It is also noteworthy, that the changes in the treatment of allied liabilities depend on gradual improvement of the economy of the partner country of the U. S. A., welfare of its population and development of national identity of the society.

Mass rallies of Japanese and South Korean population against American military presence on the territories of these countries, which is evidently perceived, as an irritant of national dignity, is a vivid illustration of this fact. (Be it a chance or not, but flashes of anti-Americanism on this ground both in Japan, and in the Republic of Korea took place exactly 44 years after each of them had signed agreement with the U. S. A. about allied mutual defense. If we suppose, that this phenomenon is typical of civilization in

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general, Ukraine should make its own conclusions concerning possible events around Russian military bases in the Crimea. Especially, that the expediency of this military presence for Ukrainian national interests is prettily debatable, and juridical legalization and sea-based stationing are far from perfect). The main thing is that allies have more possibilities to influence American policy for their own benefit and to come to understanding with the U. S. A. on the most sensible problems. Certainly, the recent decisions of American administration about global re-deployment of military bases and objects were primarily dictated by the changes in the strategic priorities of the U. S. A. However, the latter took account of positions of its allies. The suspicions as to the participation of Ukraine in the "kolchuha affair", which were never sustained, led to considerable losses in relations with America, while the far more serious misdeeds of Israel had no felt consequences for its partnership with the U. S. A. .

Usually the American regional interests are wider than the relations with the main regional partner, and, as a rule, the U. S. A. try to somehow balance regional interests in relations with leading players. This can be seen both in the region of North-Eastern Asia, and in there Near East, where, apart from Israel, an important place in American strategy is occupied, for example, by Egypt. We can only remember that in the late 90s this country was the second major receiver of American aid in the region.

One can assume, that even with the most optimistic scenario of the development of Ukrainian-American partnership, Washington will simultaneously pay no less attention to its cooperation with the Russian Federation and Central Asian countries. The prospects of Kyiv will depend on the success of its undertakings, and above all on its homework studying the lessons of other partners.

References

1. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. -The White House, Washington, D. C., September 2002.-Р. 25.

2. To support this deduction we may mention the example of statements about the development of American-Russian strategic relations, which, certainly, are limited to cooperation in a number of branches, such as nuclear weapons or control of terrorism. And Uzbekistan is the only post-soviet country, strategic partnership with which was formalized: the parties agreed on it in March 2002. The United States agreed to guarantee Tashkent general security. Specifically, the agreement envisages consultations with the Uzbek party "in case of emergency" under conditions of external threats to Uzbek safety. The Parties also pledged to intensify military cooperation, including "technical re-equipment of Uzbek Army". Evidently, that this level of cooperation is considerably lower as to the liabilities, compared to that of the U. S. A. with other allies, including NATO countries, Australia, Republic of Korea, Japan, and such close friends of America, as Singapore and New Zealand.

3. When American President Harry S. Truman and Japanese Premiere Yoshida Shigeru signed the U. S. -Japanese Security Treaty in San Francisco, September 1951, Korean Peninsula was a scene of the Civil War that transformed into authentic international armed conflict with participation of seventeen states under UNO headed by American General Douglas Macarthur, which faced People's Republic of China with North Korea.

4. See, eg : Korean Security Dynamics In Transition. Edited by Kyung-Ae Park and

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Dalchoong Kim. - Palgrave, New York. - 2001. - 133.

5. Larry Niksch. Japan-U. S. Relations: Issues for Congress. - http://www.congress.gov/erp/ib/pdf/IB97004.pdf

6. Richard P. Cronin. Japan-U. S. Relations: Issues for Congress. - http://www.congress.gov/erp/ib/pdf/IB97004.pdf

7. Quoted after: East Asian Strategic Review 2002 // The National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan, Tokyo IS 300.

8. William Cooper. Japan-U. S. Relations: Issues for Congress. - http://www.congress.gov/erp/ib/pdf/IB97004.pdf

9. East Asian Strategic Review 2001 // The National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan, Tokyo IS 277.

10. William Cooper. Japan-U. S. Relations: Issues for Congress. - http://www.congress. gov/erp/ib/pdf/IB97004.pdf

11. Larry AND. Niksch. U. S. -Korean Relations: Issues for Congress. - http://www.congress.gov/erp/ib/pdf/IB98045.pdf

12. Recently the very fact that the U. S. A. and People's Republic of China shared the common goal, i. e. establishment of stability on Korean Peninsula, even made grounds for assertions about strategic American-Chinese cooperaction. However, the experts maintain, that for these giants this region can also transform into object object of strategic controversy in the future, especially if competition becomes the routine of relations between the U. S. A. and People's Republic of China. In reality, the majority of experts think, that the short-term coincidence of American-Chinese goals dealing with the guarantees of stability on the peninsula inevitably will come to an end with the reunification of Korea and immediately transform into the conflict of strategic interests. They maintain, that already now China's main interest is neither Korean unification as such, nor the real perspective of possible loss of the "ideological ally" on peninsula. It is mostly afraid of such variant of unification possibility, which could undermine the Chinese influence on the Peninsula. -See, e. g.: Korean Security Dynamics In Transition. Edited by Kyung-Ae Park and Dalchoong Kim. -Palgrave, New York. -2001.-P. 119; How China Views Korea and its Future. // Asian Survey. - Vol. XXXV, No. 6.-June, 1995.-P. 544.

13. See, e. g., Korean Security Dynamics In Transition. Edited by Kyung-Ae Park and Dalchoong Kim. -Palgrave, New York. -2001.-P. 81, 130.

14. For example, in February 2003 the South Korean press published the results of the survey of public opinion, in accordance with which 57 percent of country population are in favor of cutting down American presence in the Republic of Korea up to the point of total evacuation of troops.

15. Mark E. Manyin South Korea-U. S. Economic Relations: Cooperation, Friction, and Future Prospects. -http://www.congress. gov/erp/rl/pdf/RL30566.pdf

16. A National Security Strategy for and New Century. -The White House, December 1999.- P. 40.

17. Lisa Seghetti and William J. Krouse. Border Security: Issues and Options. - http://www. congress. gov/brbk/html/ebter124.html.

18. Ibid.

19. A National Security Strategy for and New Century. - The White House, December 1999.-Р. 18.

20. Clyde R. Mark. Israeli-United States Relations. -http://www. congress. gov/erp/ib/pdf/IB82008.pdf

21. Ibid.

22. We would like to remind that these loud scandals were not the end of the story. During 1985-2000 American special services documented some more facts of violations of

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the transfer of sensible technologies with the participation of Israelis.

23. Only in the framework of some defense projects the U. S. A. allotted to Israel USD625m for the development and deployment of the surface-to-air complex "Arrow"; USD1.3bn for realization of the Lavi Fighter Project, that was later discontinued; USD200m for the development of the Merkata tank; USD130 m for the creation of anti-missile high-power laser armament and other defensive projects. Last fiscal year USD200m of funds were directed for the anti-terrorist measures.

See, e. g.: Clyde R. Mark. Israel: U. S. Foreign Assistance. - http://www.congress.gov/erp/ib/pdf/IB85066.pdf

24. See, e. g.: Brent Scowcroft... And. The Tools For Peace. - Washington Post, May 17, 2002.

25. In the National strategy of the U. S. A. for control of mass-destruction-weapons prolifiration published in Decem-ber 2002 we read that "effective mass-destruction- weapons counteraction strategy, including its usage and its further pro-lifiration, is the part and parcel of the Na-tional Security Strategy of the United States of America." No wonder that nothing but suspicions that the regime of Saddam Hussein had technologies to make mass destruction weapons led to anti-Iraqi intervention.

26. Clyde R. Mark. Israel: U. S. Foreign Assistance. -http://www.congress.gov/erp/ib/pdf/IB85066.pdf

27. One can remember other instances as well. For example, the influential Washington Times from March 12, 1992 featured an article on investigation, performed by the former Administration of George Bush Sr., about the transmission by Israel of the technology of the American surface-to-air missile complex "Patriot" without the consent of the U. S. A. . Next day The Wall Street Journal informed that the State Department Inspector General and and officers of the special services looked into the facts of unsanctioned transmission by Israel of the said know-how to the People's Republic of China, Republic of South Africa, Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Republic of Chile and other countries. The Israeli leaders dismissed the charges of the transfer of know-how in lack of consent of the U. S. A., as well as violation of American-Israeli agreeents about guaranteeing arms storage and about transfers of weaponry. The Commission of the State Department paid a visit to Israel in order to verify the charges preferred and found no evidence whatsoever about the fact of "Patriot" delivery to the People's Republic of China. However, the Inspector General in his report maintained that the facts of unsanctioned by the U. S. A. delivery of other technologies and equipment to other recipients by Israel actually had taken place. In October 1993 the American communications broadcasting network NBC announced that Israel transferred military equipment, including the up-to-date American technologies down to the People's Republic of China for USD1bn. In October 1995 the same agency informed that from Israel China had received the "Lava" fighter technology, a prototype of which was designed by Israel for American money and with the use of American technologies.

28. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America determine three categories of national interests in :

* Vital interests are of top priority importance for the existence, security and survival of the American state;

* Important national interests do not influence the survival of the state, but they influence the welfare of Americans and nature of the environment. The latter, for example, includes regions, where the U. S. A. have perceptible economic interests or liabilities to its allies;

* Humanitarian and other interests.

29. A National Security Strategy for and New Century. -The White House, December 1999.- P. 29-32.

30. Ibid., p. 33.

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U. S. A. Exports, Imports, and Balance of Goods

By Selected Countries and Areas-2003

In millions of dollars. Details may not equal totals due to rounding.

(-) Represents zero or less than one half of measurement shown. (R) - Revised. (X) - Not applicable.

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(1) Detailed data arc presented on a Census basis. The information needed to convert to a BOP basis is not available.

(2) Countries included in Euro Area are also included in European Union.

Source. United States Department of Commerce News

www.census.gov/foreign-trade/www/press.html or www.bea.gov/bea/rels.htm.

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