On December 17, 2002 the scientific conference "Ukrainian-American Relations: Problems and Prospects" was held at the MFA of Ukraine. The main reporters were Yevhen Kaminskiy, Doctor of History, Professor, Head of the Department of Transatlantic Research of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the NAS of Ukraine and Volodymyr Yelchenko, Deputy State Secretary of the MFA of Ukraine. You can read both of them now in our digest.

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Yevhen Kaminskiy: The point is that a general picture is clear to any one who just superficially follows the mass media publications, to say nothing about the experts involved into the consideration and analysis of the author's ideas and proposals. It is also considered that practical details and peculiarities of the problem will be presented in the second report of the diplomat every day dealing with this problem in all its specifics and knowing the American participants.

Does the situation really look so clear to everybody? I dare say that it is not so explicit. I have enough grounds to state that Ukrainian-American relations have never before been so positive as it might be perceived from their official presentation. Even repeated reference to the fact that Ukraine occupies the third place as to the volumes of the American assistance was presented in the somewhat hypertrophied coloring, at least without due attention to such circumstance as nuclear disarmament of our state with an important moment of transfer of a series of modern armament to the Russian Federation. Ukraine was at once accepted in America as a medium European state, which happened (!) to act as a subject of international relations. It has become already trivial to remember the well-known speech of J. Bush, the Senior in the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR on September 1, 1991. I am doing this consciously since the father of the current American President finalized at that time many issues perverted by the official Soviet historiography. First, I mean the story with the so- called support rendered by the Americans to the countries subdued by the communism, second, the intentions of the USA to disintegrate the USSR. So, against this background I consider the further events eventually crowned by the impatience of the American side to investigate the "armor" situation. Therefore, it was erroneous to be guided in formation of the policy line by the attitude to the USA as to the country that in fact planned to disintegrate the USSR. First of all, this approach did not consider the fact that even

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in times of the Reagan "crusade" the White House simply did not believe in such possibility. The American analysts and state officials were confident that even the start of the USSR disintegration process would cause an internal armed conflict in the world largest nuclear state and result in the chaos in the system of international relations. One part of these experts and officials in the USA aimed at drastic weakening of the Soviet Union making it more obedient, the other larger part counted on M. Gorbachev as the author of "perestroika" hoping that the USSR could adopt democracy remaining an integral state (!) and becoming a "normal" participant of the international system. Aside from politically minded part of the Americans of Ukrainian extraction nobody really believed into the appropriateness of independent Ukraine to appear on the international arena. Until the very last moment the majority of the Ukrainian population did not believe it either. Let us without emotions reconstruct the real but not assumed through the propaganda behavior of state authorities of the Ukrainian SSR on August 19-21, 1991.

It is necessary to proceed from the fact that Ukraine was recognized and is still partially recognized as a part of the system and state that lost the "cold war". So, in line with my vision, the loser-behavior problem has been always actual for Ukraine. From the beginning of the post-communist period the adherents of the Ukrainian independence did not consider this factor. On the contrary, we all felt winners. The western world did not percept the victory over the communism as the joint achievement of our and their efforts. The concept of equality we all counted for did not work. To convince the winners that we have the right to share the victory we had to either "assume a pose" choosing Chinese or Vietnamese variant of public development or unconditionally meet the requirements of the winners as our western partners from the former socialist camp did.

However, this is not all. I am absolutely sure that the strategic mistake in the evaluation of the attitude of the USA to the USSR and Ukrainian SSR should be considered together with a certain trend in the behavior of high officials of the independent Ukraine in the world not seen to everybody. Omitting concrete diplomats simply doing their job and looking at the situation generally one can state that the Ukrainian foreign policy more often than not was pursued in a way as if we were the gigantic state as the FSU used to be. In fact, there was no real transfer to the policy that was based on such prerequisite or constant that with exit from the Soviet Union as the superpower state Ukraine would undoubtedly lose in the level of national security.

With this approach a real action aimed at Ukraine integrating into one of the formations able to provide a guaranteed national security would be the inevitable element of the foreign policy strategy. I am sure that implementation of the multi- vector principle on condition of this approach would not face the constrains we have comprehended only in the last years or even months. I am using the term "integrating" instead of traditional for our political vocabulary "integration" not out of a mere chance. For example, our strategic partner Poland at once and distinctly declared about a western vector of this integrating and never rejected it. There are all grounds stating that only due to this clear systematic and geographic choice Poland received an opportunity through the gradual integrating process to the European structures to come to the integration and implement its own multi-vector policy as the NATO member and in view of its accession to the EU. The Polish at once understood that the most important for them was to meet the requirements forwarded by the key members of the European structures including the USA. It was not only understanding of the importance of the European choice for the national security but also the real measures aimed at stepwise implementation of the NATO and EU criteria.

Ukraine also has declared the European choice as its ultimate strategic goal. However,

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we are still far away from meeting the requirements for the membership in NATO and especially in the European Union. I understand that the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affair is minimal in this situation, therefore I will analyze the formal behavior of our diplomacy as integrity from the President and the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Administration of the President of Ukraine. Once we tried to dictate our terms to the West preserving a feeling of dependence on the Russian Federation. At the stage of nuclear disarmament this position produced certain positive achievement however not eventually implemented. I mean not only almost free elimination of the nuclear potential and transfer of a part of rocket complexes to Russia, but also unrealized promises of the West to grant a credit compensation for the Chernobyl nuclear power plant shutdown. They were unrealized not because the western world is so notoriously selfish and egoistic. The basic reasons are in the different political dimension. The main point is that for the West we are still indefinite, that is the state that has not yet developed a clear-cut strategy and mechanisms for implementation of the European choice. There are quite a number of grounds for this estimate. It is enough to remember a situation when one of our Ukrainian state figures being in Brussels declared that the NATO membership is our absolute strategic goal while on the next day the President of Ukraine in his speech in one of the oblast centers partially denied this statement. Firmness of Ukraine towards the Tashkent Treaty is almost the only proof of the Ukrainian decisive position. One can also remember slashing articles on the prospects of the Ukrainian membership in NATO, which were lately published in some Ukrainian mass media supported by the people playing not at all the last role in the Ukrainian political establishment.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not have another decisive argument for implementation of the President's instructions on the European choice, which is the relevant legislative act. Neither have we in place another the most important factor for western cooperation of the nations that is also beyond the control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Here I mean the unrealized promises of the Ukrainian Administration to implement the system reform and transformation in line with the criteria and requirements of the European Union and the World Trade Organization. Among other important components is the objective rightfulness of the West in its denunciation of Ukraine for violation of rights and freedoms of journalists, the use of administrative levers to influence the Parliamentarian election, the absence of positive changes in investigation of the corruption cases and scandal murders and others. All this is very important for Ukrainian-American relations because since 2001 the power in Washington is in the hands of the President, who fully shares the political views and approaches of Ronald Reagan, the author of the anti-communism crusade. No matter how we estimate the effectiveness of the strategy of the forty first President of the United States we cannot but take into account the main point, that is the effectiveness resulted from the decisiveness in implementation of the set goals. As a politician following the R. Reagan strategy in the new conditions J. Bush, the Junior is guided by the same decisiveness. Considering the real possibilities of Ukraine and with due regard to strategic coincidence of the requirements to Ukraine put forward by the American Administration I think it appropriate to propose for your consideration the following basic conclusion:

* Implementation of the European choice by Ukraine greatly depends on the level and quality of bilateral relations of the state with the United States of America. In elaborating approaches to solution of the problems related to this sphere it is advisable to proceed from the interest of Ukraine to meet the majority of the White House requirements. It is necessary to be guided by the strategic prospects of the

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development of Ukrainian state, which requires qualitative and permanent support from key actors of the international relations among which the USA plays a leading role. Ukraine needs to systematize the American requirements regarding the priorities of the national interests with subsequent development of the implementation mechanisms and criteria at the highest level. Without this approach Ukraine may face additional problems, which will restrain not only normal activities on the international arena but also the internal development. Any other approach including the one being lately professed by certain high officials of the Ukrainian power (first of all accusation in response to accusation) is not capable in the current situation to have a positive impact on desirable changes in the American position. Unrealistic feeling that the United States are interested in the Ukrainian statehood as a peculiar "thing in itself" may eventually result in a specific scheme of counter actions on the side of the USA including the use of economical levers. Orientation to the support from Russia may prove insufficient in view of the fact that two great states - the USA and Russia - are finding common position in the issues that only recently looked so critical (for example, NATO expansion). There are no grounds to consider that in case of unfavorable development of the conflict between Washington and Kyiv this agreement will be achieved in contrast to Ukrainian interests. Ukraine in case the events develop according to unfavorable scenario may face active and overall lack of restrain from the Americans as compared to the limited restrain Ukraine experienced under the process of nuclear disarmament and is experiencing now in the case with "armor" or "violation of rights of the journalists".

Commenting the Ukrainian President's complaints that "often the western colleagues do not understand us" (Moscow, December 9, 2002) the American colleague said that "similarly we can say that Ukrainians do not accept benevolent ideas and wishes of the Americans and Europeans". Some American analysts are confident that Ukraine itself often makes the situation worse. Once they indicated that the situation with "Gongadze case" could be drastically changed if the order to comb the Taraschansky wood was given to the militia. Today, to their opinion, the Government should answer one question: "if the "armor" is not in Iraq than where is it?" There is no answer to it. These two situations are very different. The latter situation is accepted by the Americans as a serious threat to their own national interests. In this sense the situation proves much more serious than a difference between the two partners.

Hence, the observance of the criteria and requirements of the Euro-Atlantic Community by Ukraine remains to be the major task for the future. I would like share my vision of some components in the systematization of these criteria and requirements. But first I would like to suggest on how important it is to forget the illusions in dealing with the Americans. The analysis made gives me the ground to consider that a hope to overcome the crises in the Ukrainian-American relations by the efforts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the President's Administration is one of these illusions. Here it is important to consider that fact that the Americans permanently and even stubbornly separate Ukraine from its President. I heard from the Americans the following statement "Today Ukraine dose not have enemies in the USA but in the Ukrainian Administration there are forces that create the enemies themselves". These are only united efforts of the Cabinet of Ministries in its new composition and the state program including the criteria proposed by the Euro- Atlantic community and corresponding to the basic national interests that can, to my conviction, assist the President of Ukraine in renovation of the Ukrainian-American dialogue at the highest level. I dare say that now it is high time to understand that without serious and independent foreign policy initiatives of the Prime Minister there will be no qualitative

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changes in the Ukrainian-American relations until 2004. The government of the USA will not enhance the applied restrictions towards Ukraine neither will there be necessary changes in trade economical relations so needed for Ukrainian economy. Another element of the impact on positive changes in the bilateral relations is a demonstrative use (or even manipulation for the sake of image) of the American anti- crises experience by high representatives from the new composition of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. This would be unexpected and effective response to different attacks of the Americans towards our President. In this case it would be appropriate to submit the following variants of the governmental actions to consideration of the President:

1. Submission to the USA State Department of a scheme for renovation of the strategic partnership by creation of the Interim Inter-Governmental Committee (its hidden goal is a gradual renovation of the Inter-State Committee with participation of the President of Ukraine and The USA Vice-President).

2. A public declaration on the necessity to introduce amendments and additions to the Declaration on the Strategic Partnership between Ukraine and the USA emphasizing its economic pragmatism and creation of joint inter-state expert group for development of the Program for Cooperation in the sphere of democratization of public relations in Ukraine on the basis of the Euro-American tradition.

3. Proposal to the American vis-a-vis to hold negotiations aimed at clarifying the whole set of claims put forward by the official Washington to Ukraine considering the need to coordinate the positions in view of renewed Declaration on the Strategic Partnership.

4. Declaration of the intention to implement a tough governmental control (possibly attracting the public control) for export of weapons, military equipment and technologies of dual purpose (an intention to create a special group of highly qualified experts for development of a relevant program of the governmental activities with maximal consideration of the nation-wide interests and international law).

5. Submission of the Program for Collaboration of NGOs of the two state for consideration by the American side in the framework of the general strategy of facilitating the civil society development.

6. Initiative for development of joint Ukrainian-American program for upgrading of professional, legal and moral level of the Ukrainian mass-media.

7. Proposal of specific activities to the American side for cooperation in struggling against international terrorism.

8. Declaration of the uniting of efforts in the fight against the organized crime in the economical sphere and money laundry as a specific element of bilateral cooperation.

9. Invitation of the specialists from the American Government for expert evaluation of the draft Tax Code of Ukraine and submission of proposals for its improvement.

It is easy to understand that the majority of these criteria fit into the system of the national interests of Ukraine by learning some American requirements well known the participants of our discussion.

I want just to mention that the Euro-American politicians are inclined to consider a noticeable retardation in introduction of the principles of civil society as a key reason for the lag in the economical reform. Economical reforms and their consequences largely depend on the precision of political orientation of the power structures. In particular, it is emphasized that Ukraine does not have such precision, therefore the way out should be searched in the realistic understanding of the European choice. Here the point lies not in the currently unrealistic idea of convergence to the EU and acquisition of the membership so widely propagated by different political forces but in soonest comprehension of the fact that such convergence requires observance of basic ideological and political criteria inherent in the European civilization. They are confident that the basic national interest of

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Ukraine and Ukrainian society on the 11th year of independence remains unchanged: formation of the civil society, fostering of the public awareness of the direct dependence of the impact of the society on the politicians and state figures and on the economical success.

The West is really interested in stable, developed and democratic Ukraine becoming one of the European centers of successful peaceful development. However, as the western experts, state figures and professional politicians firmly consider, this objective should be achieved mainly by the Ukraine's own efforts. The Western community is not intended to bear any financial or other loads to transform Ukraine into modern democratic nation with developed socially oriented market economy. In the strategic sense, successful economic reforms and democratic transformations, approach of Ukraine towards democratic criteria of the Council of Europe and requirements of the European Commission for economical transformation of social relations weigh for the official circles in the West much more than specific manifestations of corruption, tragic death of journalist Gongadze or careless statements of high-rank politicians on the cassettes of the former major Melnychenko. In identifying the USA official position to Ukraine we should speak about large-scale selection of relatively small facts used for general conclusions. However, exactly these facts are employed by the USA and Western Europe state authorities in evaluation of the Ukrainian development. The main argument, if ignore the trifles, is reduced to "a lack of responsibility" of economical elite for the future of Ukraine and unwillingness of political elite to establish cooperative relations with business on the basis of the rule of law.

In this case the American authorities display realistic and democratic thinking because they view Ukraine as an independent state in making and implementing decisions proceeding from the fact that Ukraine is more interested in the development of normal bilateral relations based on common interests. Really on common interests but with one small but essential peculiarity: strategic conditions will always be determined by the USA while Ukraine will always have the right to say its word in the course of the democratic dialogue. Finally, evaluation of the quality indices of the Ukrainian development and recognition of these indices as the prerequisite for the western position towards Ukraine will long remain a prevailing prerogative of the official Washington and Brussels.

This list of requirements and criteria may be continued but they are well known to the majority of the participants. I will confine myself to presenting my own position. I consider that realization of the majority of requirements and criteria developed by the Euro-Atlantic structures in most cases coincide with the national interest of the Ukrainian state and its citizens.

In proclaiming the European development strategy and European direction of economical and military-political integration Ukraine will have to meet economical, political and democratic criteria of the European Union and the Council of Europe. Otherwise the declared European choice will remain only ideological intention.

V. Yelchenko: I share many ideas expressed by Prof. Kaminskiy and we all have already learnt them. He has managed to grasp the major ideas being on the surface. I think we will use them in our practical work. As to the visit of the first Vice Prime- Minister, there is a verbal invitation and generally speaking we have already started preparations for this visit. In the matter of fact, I do not want to overestimate the significance on this visit keeping in mind than certain hopes were once cherished in connection with the visit of the former Prime Minister Kinakh. He undertook a trip in the period not so crucial for our relations but still difficult, however I do not think that any one could remember any tangible results of his visit. Simply because there were no results at all. Now matter who is to be blamed for this, we or Americans, but we need

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to learn this lesson and to make Azarov's visit efficient in the practical dimension. For already eleven years of independence the Ukrainian-American relations have experienced ups and downs. A complicated period of pressure to Ukraine under nuclear disarmament in the early 90s was followed by a period of dynamic development of cooperation and gradual achievement of a strategic level in the partnership. One can state that since the Clinton Administration the Ukrainian- American relations have achieved noticeable results. The USA actively assisted in the initiation of Ukraine's integration into the European and Trans-Atlantic structures and in solution of security problems in the context of Ukrainian-American relations, in rendering international assistance to the Ukrainian economy, specifically for shutting down the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. Ukraine also received security guarantees through the support of the independence of our state, sovereignty and inviolability of the frontiers. A high level of cooperation and trust have allowed Ukraine and the USA to make a joint contribution to resolution of such important problems as nuclear armament and attraction of Ukraine for participation in the international commercial cosmic projects. Both countries jointly participated in the peace-making missions in the former Yugoslavia. Fruitful cooperation in the UN and other international organizations was developed, special mechanisms of cooperation were created and effectively employed in the frames of the Kuchma-Gore Commission. Particularly I would like to mention the assistance to Ukraine rendered by the USA in the sphere of structural market and social reforms. Alongside, after election of the Bush, the Junior certain changes in the USA policy toward Ukraine have been outlined. First of all, it is worth mentioning an artificial restriction of a level of bilateral political dialogue and reduction of the process of the inter-state collaboration to solution of specific problems without incorporating them into a single strategic plan of cooperation. However, irrespective of the new USA Administration both countries during certain time continued to cooperate in such important spheres as joint counter-action against terrorism, creation of a system of missile defense, struggle against non-proliferation and export control etc. Recent period of relations between Ukraine and USA initiated by the Bush administration by publication of accusation of Ukraine for supplying to Iraq the "Armor" stations has finally completed a stage of gradual refusal of the White House from strategic partnership with Kyiv. A period of rapidly growing coolness in relations was in the long run crowned by transition of the Washington to the peremptory pressure diplomacy towards Ukraine and open defiance of our interests. In analyzing the reasons of this transition and current state of Ukrainian-American relations first of all it is important to indicate a comprehensive nature of numerous internal and external indices as well as the consequences of a number of negative factors accumulated in the last years. Creation of the Ukrainian state on the ruins of the former Soviet society put forward a number of priority tasks of fast historical transition from totalitarian to democratic social system, however the lack of specific verified models of this transformation caused objective difficulties in development of the young Ukrainian state towards democratic society and market economy. Ukraine was often fairly criticized by the western countries, first of all by the USA. Among difficulties it is worth mentioning creation of effective system for protection of the mass media freedom, fighting corruption, functioning of the independent court system, which, among other things, is related to fast and fair solution of the problems of foreign investors. At the end of 90-s the USA started actively exaggerating the problem of corruption and violation of the rights of foreign companies in Ukraine. A tendency for reduction of the financial assistance, bilateral commodity turnover, rates of the American

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investments into the economy of Ukraine, introduction of new trade barriers is increasing. A fall in the orientation of Ukrainian enterprises to the American market has proved the existence of serious economical problems in relations of the two countries. On the other hand, Washington was irritated by our attempts to pursue independent foreign policy, which sometimes does not coincide with a straightforward vision of the Bush Administration, by our efforts to be established at the highly competitive world market of weapon or by our relevant response to discrimination actions of the USA towards the export of certain Ukrainian commodities. In this connection the problem of "armor" would not be so crucial if it were not preceded by an exaggerated issue related to the supplies of heavy weapon to the legal government of Macedonia, conflict around import of the American chicken meat to Ukraine, problems of protection of intellectual property. It is also important to take into account a personality of the current American President, who is not a foreign policy expert and is strongly affected by the Minister of Defense Mr. Ramsfeld and the national Security Advisor Ms Reis. It is noteworthy that the foreign policy concept of Ms Reis is underlain by the idea of selective development with the leading states of the Central-Eastern Europe. Ukraine, in her opinion, has never been in this list. Among the leading countries she ranks first of all Poland as a partner from the Central-Eastern Europe and the Russian Federation among the CIS countries. It is also necessary to note that the focus of Washington on the anti-terrorist campaign in Afghanistan after the September 11 events and the latest preparation to the war against Iraq has distracted attention of the US Administration from strategic domain of Ukrainian-American relations. Hence further steps of Washington towards Ukraine have gradually acquired a random character without comprehension of their long-term consequences. In this conditions the situation with "armor" became for the USA rather formal excuse for announcement of its intention to review the policy towards Ukraine and its state authorities and in fact a public recognition of the changes in the American policy towards Ukraine that already happened. Moreover, after slashing attacks on the Bush Administration for its ignoring the information of the special service on prevention the September 11 events the authorities of the USA National Security Council could not on the eve of the war with Iraq to ignore the publication of Melnychenko's materials in the mass media, otherwise it would cause further criticism of the Republicans right before the mid-term elections to the USA Congress. Therefore, one can state that the deterioration of Ukrainian-American relations was resulted from a complicated combination of reasons caused by the course of events inside Ukraine and USA as well as on the international arena. In this context the results of the investigation of the possible transfer of "armor" stations to Iraq by the American and British experts could not essentially affect the general situation developed in the Ukrainian-American relations. What can be expected from the further development of the Ukrainian-American relations? Analysis of the behavior of the US Administration towards Ukraine suggests a conclusion that Washington lacks a clear strategic vision of further relations with Kyiv and their role in the general system of priorities and long-tern tasks of the American foreign policy. Neither there is a defined position as to tactics towards Ukraine. Irrespective of the practical steps in applying to Ukraine the so-called new approach, for example reduction of the scope of assistance decided, by the way, before the end of the "armor" case investigation a comprehensive program for collaboration with Ukraine will hardly be developed. A Washington response to the events in the sphere of Ukrainian-American relations remains, to our opinion, situational with a strong emotional coloring. Besides, by its statement on the termination of the dialogue at the highest level with preservation

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of the course for collaboration with Ukraine at a lower level the White House has denied itself a possibility to normalize the bilateral relations during the next two years. In estimating the prospects of the Ukrainian-American relations it is necessary to take into account the peculiarities of the foreign policy of current US Administration when the many countries in the world experience exacerbation of relations with the USA, even its biggest friends and allies. The reason of that is an increasing intention of the Bush Administration to act on the international arena exclusively proceeding from its own interests. Current foreign policy approaches of Washington are characterized by its attempts to establish its dominating position in the spheres of its direct interests as well as by ignoring the efforts of the world community to act jointly in solving the global problems. It is also noteworthy that despite of the worldwide criticism of this position of the USA President he is largely supported by the Americans and this support conditioned the victory of the Republican Party during the elections to the Congress in November, 2002. The above gives all grounds to shake the belief in fast changes in the foreign policy approaches of the current Administration. Therefore, one can expect further aggravation of Ukrainian-American relations and strengthening of political and financial and economical pressure on Ukraine. Among concrete steps that the USA can make in the nearest time is further complications in foreign policy contacts of Ukraine and its progress in advancing the Ukrainian initiatives in international organizations even if they do not affect the USA interests but capable to strengthen the image of Ukraine on the international arena. In the financial and economical sphere one can expect a further reduction in the scope of the American assistance and hardening of the conditions for its rendering. At the same time one need to remember that the USA may use its influence in the IMF, the World Bank and the EBRD to complicate the access of Ukraine to credits. The above scenario forces us to develop measures for preventing the actions that may damage not only bilateral relations but also international position of Ukraine and relations with the countries being friends and allies of the USA. These measures may be facilitated by the forces in the USA Administration that comprehend the importance to preserve the partnership relations with Ukraine and may convince the top leaders of the country in the necessity to continue cooperation or at least to keep the collaboration priorities in such spheres as military sector, struggle with terrorism etc. Among the mentioned forces first of all the USA military authorities should be mentioned. In view of the above the most promising trend, to our opinion, is to maintain an appropriate level of collaboration with the USA and to preserve the positive achievements in the Ukrainian-American relations. In this respect Ukraine should in the first place use the interest of Washington to such priority issues as non-proliferation of export control, which will long remain the central issue in our collaboration in view of a great number of experts of relevant qualification in Ukraine, cooperation in the struggle against international terrorism, in the sphere of localization of ongoing regional conflicts and prevention of new ones, for example in Pridnestrovye and Abkhazia, collaboration in the Union of States (Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova). It is important to concentrate the efforts to ensure a practical role of Ukraine as a motive force of the Union of States with the aim of stimulating the activities of this organization in the spheres the USA is concerned about and supportive. Ukraine should also exert the efforts for preserving the current mechanisms of bilateral cooperation, particularly the Committee on Foreign Policy, the Committee on Economical Cooperation and the Committee on Cultural Heritage as well as for extending contacts of the Verkhovna Rada with the USA Congress. At the same time it is advisable to deeper

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investigate the tendencies in the USA home policy, changes in the electoral domain, possibilities for lobbying activities in protecting the interests of Ukraine as well as to intensify the relations with representatives of the Democratic Party and the leaders of Ukrainian, Polish and Jewish Diaspora in the USA. Demonstrating actual sense of our state for constructive dialogue and gradual solution of the problems in the bilateral relations Ukraine at the same time (through contacts with the American side) should persistently and successively defend its right for implementation of its own home and foreign policy independent on the subjective inclinations of the USA regarding first of all the national interests. In particular, we cannot allow the practical implementation of the Euro-Atlantic hopes to transform into the hostage of anti-Ukrainian policy of the White House because the Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine is a strategic and long-term task that should not become dependent on the current situation in relations with this or other country. At the same time regarding repeated statements of current American politicians on the readiness to preserve mutual beneficial cooperation with Ukraine we should ask for specific practical confirmation of the once announced statements. This first of all concerns the support of the interests of Ukraine in the sphere of integration into the European political and economical structures, development of our relations with NATO, membership in WTO and others. Implementation of the above tasks alongside with persistent defending of our positions in the spheres of the Ukrainian priority will provide, to our opinion, advancement of our interests in the international relations at large and in relations with the USA, in particular. It will also create the basis for future overall improvement of the atmosphere of the Ukrainian-American cooperation. Thank you for your attention.

Translated by Alla Horska

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